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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VAL M. ELLISON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT, and 
HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 20080145-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has pour-over jurisdiction under section 78 A-4-103(2)(j) of the Utah Code. 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction under section 78A-3-102(3)(j) of the Utah Code. 
The order appealed from was entered January 23, 2008.l The plaintiff-appellant filed his 
Notice of Appeal on February 8, 2008, which was timely under rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
lR. 647-657. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was summary judgment precluded by genuine issues of material fact? "An 
appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of 
summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
There are not any specific constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or 
regulations whose interpretation alone is determinative of this appeal or of central importance 
to it. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal entered on summary judgment in a 
civil case. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below, 
The plaintiff-appellant, Val M. Ellison, filed his complaint on June 30, 2005.3 
Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co. ("Hartford), a defendant-appellee, filed a motion 
2Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 6 , 177 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
3R.2-12. 
2 
for summary judgment on December 1, 2006.4 Later, Utah County Government ("the 
County), also a defendant-appellee, filed a motion for summary judgment on January 26, 
2007.5 Mr. Ellison filed a response to Hartford's motion on January 5, 2007,6 and a response 
to the County's motion on March 27, 2007.7 
Oral arguments on the defendants' motions were held July 20, 2007.8 At the 
conclusion of oral arguments, the trial court ruled from the bench in favor of the defendants.9 
Soon thereafter, Hartford prepared and filed a proposed order granting the defendants' 
motions for summary judgment, and Mr. Ellison filed a written objection to it on October 4, 
2007.10 In a minute entry dated January 22, 2008, the trial court acknowledged that 
Hartford's proposed order "does, indeed, extend substantially beyond the rationale and 
findings expressed by the Court at the time of the hearing."1l Nevertheless, after deleting only 
part of a single paragraph of the proposed order, the trial court went ahead and caused 
4R. 73-76. 
5R. 502-504. 
6R. 416-435. 
7R. 539-612 
8R. 641-644. 
9R. 644. 
10R. 645-657. 
uFor some reason, this Minute Entry does not appear in the record. Mr. Ellison is in 
the process of filing a motion to correct this error in the record. 
3 
Hartford's proposed order to be entered anyway on January 23,2008.12 On February 8,2008, 
Mr. Ellison filed a Notice of Appeal.13 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Because this appeal asserts that there are disputed issues of material fact, such facts 
are discussed in greater detail in the argument section of this brief. The following, however, 
is a brief overview of the relevant facts. 
Val Ellison entered into an employment contract with the County, pursuant to which 
he began working for the County in July 1995.14 As part of this employment contract, the 
County agreed to provide life insurance for Mr. Ellison and supplemental life-insurance 
coverage for his dependents.15 Sometime thereafter, Mr. Ellison purchased a supplemental 
life-insurance policy on his wife, Sherrie Ellison, through Hartford ("the Policy").16 Neither 
the County or Hartford ever provided Mr. Ellison or his wife with a copy of the Policy.17 
l2R. 647-657. 
13SeeR. 658-659. 
14R. 408, 598, 606. 
15R. 408, 598, 605. 
16R. 408, 431, 598, 605. 
17R. 555-556, 595. 
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Among other things, the Policy states that the County's "responsibilities include:... 
Notifying employees of their right to exercise the Conversion Privilege" in situations where, 
for example, a dependent may be excluded from coverage under the Policy by divorce.18 
Although Mr. Ellison and his wife eventually divorced, they had "an agreement" that 
the Policy would be used to "help the kids with education and things like that."19 Mr. 
Ellison's wife specially told him "to use the insurance to help the kids with missions and 
schooling and so forth."20 Due to the existence of this agreement, neither Mr. Ellison or his 
wife thought it was necessary to subsequently address the Policy in their divorce decree.21 
Given the fact that Mr. Ellison and his wife were preparing for divorce, as well as the 
fact that Mr. Ellison's wife suffered from terminal cancer, Mr. Ellison contacted the County' s 
human-resource department to learn what he needed to do to maintain the Policy after 
divorce.22 An unidentified representative from the County' s human-resource department told 
Mr. Ellison that he only needed to "continue to make the premium payments in order to 
continue life insurance coverage."23 This County representative did not tell Mr. Ellison that 
18R. 406-407, 542, 595. 
19R. 323, 431, 597. 
20R. 287, 431, 548, 597. 
21R. 287,431,548, 597. 
22R. 271-272, 276-277, 282, 405, 597, 604-605. 
23R. 271, 276-277, 320, 404-405, 558, 597. 
5 
he needed to fill out any additional paperwork or take any further action to ensure coverage 
after divorce.24 
During this conversation with the County representative in question, Mr. Ellison asked 
for "something in writing" to confirm what the representative had told him.25 In response, the 
representative gave Mr. Ellison Hartford's telephone number and told him to call it to obtain 
the written confirmation he desired.26 Consequently, on January 30, 2003, Mr. Ellison 
contacted Hartford by telephone at the number the County representative had given to him.27 
During Mr. Ellison's telephone call to Hartford, he spoke with Hartford employee 
Linda Daly.28 Mr. Ellison told Ms. Daly that the County "told me that you can continue 
insurance on your spouse even if you get divorced."29 Ms. Daly confirmed the County's 
representations regarding the Policy and said, "[Y]es. . . . I think that's your option if you 
want to and you continue t o . . . they're going to be payroll deducting for her[,] so if you want 
to keep her on there, that's fine."30 Ms. Daly did not, however, ever tell Mr. Ellison that he 
24R. 271, 276-277, 363-364, 405, 431, 558, 597, 603. 
25R. 430, 573, 597, 603. 
26R. 405, 430, 573-574, 597, 603. 
27R. 430, 553, 552, 596. 
28R. 404, 430, 573-574, 596. 
29R. 430, 573-574, 596. 
30 R. 320, 336, 430, 573-574, 596. 
needed to fill out any additional paperwork or take any further action in order to ensure 
coverage after divorce.31 
As Mr. Ellison's conversation with Ms. Daly came to a close, Ms. Daly told Mr. 
Ellison that she would transfer his call to a different Hartford employee so that he could 
obtain any additional verification that he might desire.32 As a result, Mr. Ellison then spoke 
with a second, albeit unidentified, Hartford employee about the continuation of the Policy 
following divorce.33 This Hartford employee also told Mr. Ellison that the only thing he 
needed to do to continue coverage under the Policy after his divorce was to continue paying 
the required premiums.34 Whether Mr. Ellison's conversation with this second Hartford 
employee was recorded is unknown, but Mr. Ellison has not been given a copy of any such 
recording.35 
Due to the multiple representations that the defendants' employees made to Mr. 
Ellison about the continuation of the Policy following divorce, Mr. Ellison simply continued 
to pay the Policy premiums following his divorce.36 He did not complete any additional 
31R. 331,430, 573-574. 
32R. 335, 573-574. 
33R. 334-335, 337, 430. 
34R. 334, 430. 
35R. 403. 
36R. 296-297, 333. 
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paperwork or take any further action.37 Instead, he simply followed the County and Hartford 
employees' instructions: i.e., he just continued to pay the premiums.3* 
Mr. Ellison's divorce was finalized on August 219 2003.39 Soon thereafter, on October 
27,2003, his former wife, Sherrie Ellison, passed away following a long bout with cancer.40 
However, during the period of time between their divorce and Ms. Ellison's subsequent 
death, the County continued to deduct from Mr. Ellison's income to pay the premiums on the 
Policy, and Hartford continued to accept these payments.41 Nevertheless, when Mr. Ellison 
later filed a claim for benefits under the Policy as a result of Ms. Ellison's passing, the 
defendants denied his claim and refused to honor either the Policy or the multiple 
representations that they had made to him about the Policy.42 The defendants' stated reason 
for denying Mr. Ellison's claim was that neither he or Ms. Ellison ever completed the 
necessary steps to have the Policy "converted" after their divorce.43 
37R. 333. 
38R. 296-298, 333. 
39R. 405, 605. 
40R. 405, 604-605. 
41R. 296-297. 
42R.402,601. 
43R. 300-301,401-402,598. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case is about whether or not the trial court erred by granting the defendants' 
motions for summary judgment when there are genuine issues of material fact. For example, 
there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether the defendants made 
misrepresentations, either knowingly or recklessly, to Mr. Ellison upon which he reasonably 
relied to his detriment. There are disputed issues of material fact as to whether the defendants 
acted unfairly and in bad faith in various respects. And there are disputed issues of material 
fact as to whether Mr. Ellison's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. 
It is Mr. Ellison's contention that, by either discrediting or disregarding the admissible 
evidence giving rise to these disputed material facts, and by otherwise ignoring various 
reasonable inferences in Mr. Ellison's favor, the trial court erred. Consequently, the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants should be reversed, and this matter 
should be remanded so that the parties may continue to prepare for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PRECLUDED 
BY GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
The defendants' motions for summary judgment should have been denied because 
there were genuine issues of material fact. "A summary judgment movant must show both 
that there is no material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
9 
of law.' Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law.5'45 The "facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" must be 
viewed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."46 Indeed, even where the parties 
are "not in complete conflict as to certain facts," but "the understanding, intention, and 
consequences of those facts [are] vigorously disputed," the matter is not proper for summary 
judgment and "can only be resolved by a trial."47 
Given that there are disputed issues of material fact in this case, it was improper for 
the trial court to grant the defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
L THERE IS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF MISREPRESENTATIONS THAT 
CREATE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
In anticipation of his divorce, Mr. Ellison acted with reasonable diligence to determine 
whether and how coverage under the Policy might be affected in the event of divorce. 
Because neither of the defendants had ever provided Mr. Ellison with a copy of the Policy, 
he contacted at least one County employee and two Hartford employees in order to make this 
^Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT 2, f 12, 177 P.3d 600. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
'Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ^ 6. 
Sandberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291, 1292 (Utah 1978). 
10 
determination.48 All three of these individuals, in succession and without exception, informed 
Mr. Ellison that his anticipated divorce would in no way affect coverage if he simply 
continued to pay the premiums.49 None of these three individuals told Mr. Ellison that he 
needed to take additional action, beyond simply paying the premiums, to secure coverage.^0 
In reliance upon these representations, Mr. Ellison stopped investigating the matter any 
further and instead simply continued to pay the necessary premiums, as he had been 
advised.51 Nevertheless, when he subsequently filed a claim for benefits under the Policy, his 
claim was denied because he had failed, according to the defendants, to properly "convert" 
his Policy at the time of divorce.52 
Due to the defendants5 failure to honor Mr. Ellison's insurance claim, Mr. Ellison 
filed the present lawsuit against them, alleging fraud, estoppel, negligence, breach of 
contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.53 In opposition to this 
lawsuit, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment seeking to have this matter 
48R. 271-272,276-277,282,334-335,337,404-405,430,573-574,596-597,604-605. 
49R. 271, 276-277, 320, 331, 334, 336, 363-364, 404-405, 430-431, 558, 573-574, 
596-597, 603. 
50R. 271, 276-277, 331, 363-364, 405, 430-431, 558, 573-574, 597, 603. 
5lR. 296-298, 333. 
52R. 300-301, 401-402, 598, 601. 
53R.2-12. 
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dismissed with prejudice.54 The trial court granted both of these motions in favor of the 
defendants.55 One of the main reasons why the trial court granted these motions was because, 
in the court's opinion, there was no admissible evidence that Mr. Ellison had a conversation 
with any County or Hartford employee (other than with Linda Daly) regarding continuation 
of the Policy after divorce.56 This opinion, however, is incorrect. In particular, Mr. Ellison 
has presented admissible evidence of representations that the defendants' employees made 
to him about the continuation of the Policy after divorce, and, as explained below, this 
evidence creates genuine issues of material fact. 
A. Credibility. 
Mr. Ellison presented evidence to the trial court of conversations he had with (1) at 
least one unidentified County employee from the County's human-resource department; (2) 
Linda Daly, a Hartford employee; and (3) another, albeit unidentified, Hartford employee. 
The trial court purported to make findings of fact with respect to this evidence and found that 
R^. 73-76, 502-504. 
;R. 641-644. 
TL 648, 651. 
12 
it was not either "credible"57 or "reliable."58 Concerns over the credibility of evidence, 
however, are issues of fact that should only be resolved at trial—nothy summary judgment.^9 
Regarding the credibility of the evidence Mr. Ellison presented about his conversation 
with a representative of the County's human-resource department and with the unidentified 
Hartford representative, the trial court apparently discredited and disregarded this evidence 
because, according to the trial court, the evidence is "self-serving."60 But, self-serving or not, 
credibility is a question of fact that should be reserved for trial.61 "The fact finder may or may 
not find such self-serving testimony credible."62 The decision belongs to the fact finder.63 It 
was, therefore, improper to decide these credibility issues on summary judgment. 
B. Reasonable Inferences. 
Not only is the credibility of evidence an issue of fact that should be decided at trial, 
but to the extent any inferences reasonably arising out of such evidence create disputed issues 
57Transcript, at 60. 
58R. 7. 
59van der Hevde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co.. 845 P.2d 275, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
60Transcript, at 61. 
61Larsen v. Exclusive Cars. Inc.. 2004 UT App. 259, f 11 n.2, 297 P.3d 714. 
62van der Hevde. 845 P.2d at 280. 
63IcL 
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of material fact, then summary judgment should be denied.64 In the present case, there are 
various reasonable inferences which, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Ellison, create 
genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Many of such 
inferences are a product of Mr. Ellison's recorded and subsequently-transcribed telephone 
conversation with Hartford employee Linda Daly.65 
Given that Mr. Ellison's telephone conversation with Ms. Daly was recorded, the fact 
that Mr. Ellison had a telephone conversation with Ms. Daly about the Policy is undisputed.66 
The admissibility of the transcript of this conversation is also undisputed.67 What is disputed, 
however, is the interpretation and meaning of this conversation, as well as any inferences 
arising therefrom. This dispute is, alone, a sufficient basis for reversing the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment for the defendants. 
During their telephone conversation, Mr. Ellison informed Ms. Daly that he had 
obtained her telephone number from the County, that the County had told him that he only 
needed to continue paying the premiums to maintain coverage, and that he wanted 
verification from Hartford confirming the County's representations.68 Ms. Daly affirmed the 
64Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, If 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
65R. 573-574. 
<*R. 404, 430, 573-574, 596; Transcript, at 51:10-12. 
67Transcript, at 51:11-12. 
68R. 573-574. 
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County's representations and stated: u[Y]es. . . . I think that's your option if you want to 
[continue coverage after divorce;] when you continue to, they are going to be payroll 
deducting for [Sherrie Ellison], so if you want to keep her on there, that's fine."69 
As Mr. Ellison's conversation with Ms. Daly came to a close, Ms. Daly told Mr. 
Ellison that, if he wished, she would have his call transferred to a second Hartford employee 
so that he could obtain any additional verification that he might desire.70 Consequently, Mr. 
Ellison's call was transferred to a different Hartford employee.71 According to Mr. Ellison's 
sworn testimony, this second Hartford employee again confirmed that the Policy would not 
be affected by divorce so long as the premiums were paid.72 
This telephone conversation between Mr. Ellison and Ms. Daly creates various 
reasonable inferences which, when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Ellison as the 
nonmoving party, create genuine issues of material fact that should have been preserved for 
trial, such as the following: 
First, given that Mr. Ellison obtained Ms. Daly's telephone number from the County, 
it' may be reasonably inferred that Mr. Ellison did in fact speak with the County 
representative that gave him Ms. Daly's number. This inference tends to corroborate Mr. 
69R. 320, 336, 430, 573-574, 596. 
70R. 335, 573-574. 
71R. 334-335, 337,430. 
72R. 334, 430. 
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Ellison's testimony that he spoke with a representative of the County's human-resource 
department, and that this representative told Mr. Ellison that he did not need to do anything 
except continue to pay the premiums in order to maintain coverage following divorce. 
Second, given that Ms. Daly told Mr. Ellison that she would transfer his call to a 
different Hartford employee so that he could obtain any additional assurances that he might 
desire, it can be reasonably inferred that Mr. Ellison's call was in fact transferred to a 
different Hartford employee. It can also be reasonably inferred that Mr. Ellison spoke with 
this second Hartford employee about the Policy. These reasonable inferences, when viewed 
in the light most favorable to Mr. Ellison, corroborate Mr. Ellison's testimony that he spoke 
with a second Hartford employee, and that this employee agreed with the representations that 
had been previously made to him concerning continuation of the Policy. 
Third, given that, after speaking with the defendants' employees, Mr. Ellison 
apparently took no action (other than to continue paying the premiums) to secure coverage 
under the Policy, it can be reasonably inferred that these employees did in fact tell Mr. 
Ellison that he only needed to continue to pay the premiums to maintain coverage. Among 
other things, this inference creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Ellison 
reasonably relied upon the representations that the defendants' employees made to him. 
16 
These reasonable inferences, and the facts giving rise to them, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to Mr. Ellison, create genuine issues of material fact that should have 
been preserved for trial.73 
C Admissibility. 
As has already been noted, the evidence of Mr. Ellison's telephone call with Ms. Daly 
is undisputed. Whether the evidence of Mr. Ellison's conversation with the representative of 
the County's human-resource department is admissible, however, is disputed, as is also the 
evidence of Mr. Ellison's conversation with the unidentified Hartford employee to whom Ms. 
Daly transferred his call.74 The trial court apparently believed such evidence was 
inadmissible hearsay, and therefore did not consider it, because the identities of these two 
employees are unknown.75 Although the identities of these employees may be unknown, 
however, does not mean that the evidence in question must be inadmissible hearsay. 
First, this evidence is not hearsay because it is not being "offered... to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted";76 that is, it is not being offered to prove that the statements made to 
Mr. Ellison were true. Indeed, this case arises because "the matter asserted" is false. Rather, 
the statements were offered merely to show that the defendants did in fact make 
'Orvis, 2008 UT 2, \ 6. 
R^. 648, 651. 
Transcript, at 36-37, 50-52. See Utah R. Evid. 801(c). 
I d 
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representations to Mr. Ellison upon which he reasonably relied to his detriment. By 
definition, this evidence is not hearsay.77 
Second, this evidence cannot be hearsay because any statement in it "is offered against 
a party and is . . . the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative 
capacity."78 As the defendants' agents, having at least apparent authority from their 
respective principals, the unidentified County and Hartford employees acted for their 
principals, thereby binding the defendants, when they made the representations at issue to 
Mr. Ellison.79 As a result, such statements are not hearsay because they constitute admissions 
by a party-opponent.80 
Third, the hearsay rule does not exclude this evidence because it is composed of 
"statements against interest."81 A statement may be excepted from the hearsay rule if, "at the 
time of its making," it was 
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid 
a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the 
78Id 801(d)(2). 
79See Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co.. 232 P.2d 754, 757 (Utah 1951); see 
also S. W. Bridges & Co. v. Candland. 54 P.2d 842, 848 (Utah 1936); Vadner v. Rozzelle, 
45 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1935). 
80Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2). 
81Id 804(b)(3). 
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declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to 
be true.82 
The statements were against the declarant's interest because, if true, they would subject the 
defendants to liability for insurance benefits for Mr. Ellison's wife. A reasonable person in 
the position of the defendants' employees would not have made such statements unless they 
believed them to be true. The statements, therefore, are not inadmissible hearsay, and the trial 
court should have considered such evidence. 
II. THE MISREPRESENTATIONS CONCERN PRESENTLY EXISTING 
MATERIAL FACTS, 
The misrepresentations that the defendants' employees made to Mr. Ellison concerned 
facts then in existence. The misrepresentations were about whether the Policy, at that specific 
moment in time, provided that coverage for dependents continued, even after divorce, so long 
as the premiums continued to be paid. In other words, the misrepresentations concerned the 
provisions and procedures of the Policy in their then-existing form. As such, the 
misrepresentations concerned material facts which were then in existence. Indeed, even the 
trial court and opposing counsel recognized the plausibility and reasonableness of this 
inference during oral arguments.83 Consequently, given that all reasonable inferences should 
be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, this inference should have 
Transcript, at 22:7-14. 
19 
been made, and, as a result, the defendants' motions for summary judgment should have been 
denied.84 
III. WHETHER THE MISREPRESENTATIONS WERE MADE KNOWINGLY 
OR RECKLESSLY IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Liability for fraud can be found where a misrepresentation is made either knowingly 
or recklessly.85 Whether a person made a misrepresentation knowingly or recklessly, 
however, is a question of fact.86 Indeed, fraud may exist even where a party "knew nothing 
about the matter and . . . recklessly affirm[ed] as a fact something of which [he was] entirely 
ignorant."87 Nevertheless, the trial court dismissed Mr. Ellison's fraud claims because, 
according to the trial court, "no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the transcript of 
the recording of the Daly call manifests an intent by Ms. Daly to deceive or misrepresent a 
fact."88 The trial court's dismissal of Mr. Ellison's fraud claims on this basis is improper for 
840rvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f^ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
85Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 2001 UT 25, Tf 33, 21 
P.3d 198. 
86State v. Barzee, 2007 UT 95, lj 81, 177 P.3d 48 ("Issues such as reasonableness, 
knowledge, and proximate cause are fact questions to be resolved by the fact finder . . . . " ) . 
87Stuck v. Delta Land & Water Co.. 227 P. 791, 804 (Utah 1924). 
88R. 650. 
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at least the following reasons: 
First, as already noted, whether a person makes a misrepresentation knowingly or 
recklessly, is a question of fact.89 The trial court, therefore, should not have made factual 
findings regarding this issue at the summary-judgment stage. 
Second, as has also already been noted, fraud can be found where a misrepresentation 
is made either knowingly or recklessly.90 Even though a person may not have knowingly 
made a misrepresentation, that person can still be liable for fraud if she did it recklessly.91 It 
was, therefore, error for the trial court to dismiss Mr. Ellison's fraud claims simply because 
the trial court did not find a "knowing" misrepresentation;92 the trial court should have also 
considered whether there was a "reckless" misrepresentation.93 
And, third, simply because Ms. Daly may not have made a misrepresentation either 
knowingly or recklessly does not mean that the other Hartford employee Mr. Ellison spoke 
with was similarly innocent. Nor does it mean that the County employee Mr. Ellison spoke 
with was innocent. In other words, the trial court erred by dismissing Mr. Ellison's fraud 
'State v. Barzee. 2007 UT 95, % 81. 
'Franco, 2001 UT 25,133. 
Id 
'R. 650. 
Franco, 2001 UT 25,^33. 
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claims against the defendants simply because one of the three individuals who made 
misrepresentations to Mr. Ellison may not have done so knowingly. 
IV. WHETHER MR. ELLISON ACTED WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE AND 
REASONABLY RELIED UPON THE MISREPRESENTATIONS IS A 
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Despite the evidence of the defendants' misrepresentations, the trial court dismissed 
all of Mr. Ellison's claims because it did not believe that Mr. Ellison acted with reasonable 
diligence or that he reasonably relied upon the representations made to him.94 In particular, 
the trial court dismissed Mr. Ellison's negligence claim against the County because, 
according to the court, Mr. Ellison did not act with reasonable diligence to determine the 
Policy's provisions and procedures.95 Likewise, the trial court dismissed Mr. Ellison's fraud 
and estoppel claims because the court did not consider Mr. Ellison's reliance upon the 
defendants' misrepresentations as having been reasonable.96 
Whether Mr. Ellison acted with reasonable diligence and reasonably relied upon the 
representations that the defendants made to him, however, is a genuine issue of material fact 
that should have been preserved for trial. As a result, the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants was in error. 
'R. 647-651. 
!R. 647-648. 
ft. 648-651. 
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A, Reasonable Diligence. 
In Utah, reasonableness must generally "be considered with reference to the facts of 
each case, and is usually a question for the jury to determine."97 Despite this principle, the 
trial court dismissed Mr. Ellison's negligence claim against the County because, in the 
court's opinion, Mr. Ellison failed to act with reasonable diligence to "inform[] himself 
regarding the Policy's provisions and procedures."98 But this conclusion, when considered 
"with reference to the facts," is erroneous because it is premised upon disputed issues of 
material fact.99 
The evidence before the trial court showed, among other things, that the County never 
provided Mr. Ellison with a copy of the Policy.100 Likewise, the County never notified Mr. 
Ellison of his "right to exercise the Conversion Privilege," despite the County's contractual 
duty to do so. When, however, Mr. Ellison later tried to inform himself of the Policy's 
provisions and procedures by contacting the County's human-resource department, at least 
one representative from that department provided Mr. Ellison with incorrect information 
about the Policy. Based upon this incorrect information, as well as the incorrect information 
97Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.. 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(emphases added) see EDSA/Cloward LLC v. Klibanoff. 2005 UT App. 367, % 21,122 P.3d 
646. 
98R. 647-648. 
"Conder, 739 P.2d at 638. 
100R. 555-556, 595. 
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that he subsequently received from Hartford, Mr. Ellison reasonably believed that no 
additional action was required to maintain coverage so long as he continued to pay the 
premiums. As a result, he simply continued to pay the premiums, believing all the while that 
he was in strict compliance with the Policy's provisions and procedures. 
When viewing these facts, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, in the light 
most favorable to Mr. Ellison, the question as to whether Mr. Ellison acted with reasonable 
diligence to determine the Policy's provisions and procedures becomes a genuine issue of 
material fact, which should be preserved for trial. In any event, the trial court should have 
refrained from dismissing Mr. Ellison's negligence claim because, "[a]s a general 
proposition, summary judgment is inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits, 
and should be employed 'only in the most clear-cut case.'"101 Indeed, "[o]rdinarily the 
question of negligence . . . may not be settled on a motion for summary judgment."102 
"[S]ummary judgment is rarely an appropriate remedy for resolving negligence actions."103 
For these additional reasons, Mr. Ellison's negligence claim should also have never been 
dismissed. 
101
 Wvcalis v. Guardian Title. 780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
102Preston v. Lamb. 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1968); see Butler v. Sports Haven 
Int'l 563 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah 1977). 
103Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 1985). 
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B. Reasonable Reliance. 
Likewise, Mr. Ellison's other claims, such as those for fraud and estoppel, were not 
properly subject to dismissal on summary judgment because whether Mr. Ellison reasonably 
relied upon the defendants' misrepresentations is a disputed issue of material fact.l04Based 
upon language from Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co.,1(b however, the trial court 
determined otherwise.106 This determination was incorrect. 
Perkins involved a situation where an insured made material misrepresentations in her 
life-insurance application.107 After the insured died, and her misrepresentations were 
discovered, the insurer refused to honor the insurance policy that it had previously issued on 
the insured's life, even though the insurer had collected premiums from the insured in 
connection with the policy.108 The insured's husband sued the insurer, claiming that the 
insurer should be estopped from voiding the policy because the insurer had collected 
premiums from the insured in connection with the policy.109 The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the dismissal of the husband's estoppel claim because his wife "had the means by 
104EDSA/Cloward LLC, 2005 UT App. 367, f 21. 
105Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co.. 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
106Transcript, at 62:19 to 63:4. 
107Perkms, 814 P.2d at 1127-28. 
108IcL 
109Id at 1130-31. 
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which she could have ascertained the contents of [the] policy," but she did not put forth any 
effort "to learn the terms of her insurance policy."110 Consequently, the court declared that 
"her reliance . . . was not reasonable."111 
Perkins is readily distinguishable from the facts at issue in the present case. First, 
unlike Perkins, there are no allegations that the insured (Mr. Ellison) made any 
misrepresentations to his insurer (the defendants) at the time the policy was issued. Second, 
unlike Perkins, there is evidence that the insurer (the defendants) made misrepresentations 
to the insured (Mr. Ellison) about the policy. Third, unlike Perkins, there is evidence that the 
misrepresentations that were made to the insured were about the perpetuation of the policy: 
they were not mere misrepresentations about the Policy's contents, but they were instead 
affirmative misrepresentations about what Mr. Ellison needed to do to perpetuate coverage 
prospectively. Fourth, unlike Perkins, there is evidence that the insured actually put forth 
effort to try to discover the policy's provisions and procedures: in fact, the evidence shows 
that Mr. Ellison made multiple attempts to obtain information about the Policy from the 
defendants. Fifth, unlike Perkins, the estoppel claim in the present matter is not based solely 
on the insurer's acceptance of the premiums: although Hartford's acceptance of the 
premiums is relevant, the primary basis of Mr. Ellison's estoppel claim is that the defendants 
made multiple misrepresentations to him upon which he reasonably relied to his detriment. 
1 1 0 Ida t l l31 . 
111Idi 
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And, sixth, unlike Perkins, Mr. Ellison has not only brought an estoppel claim against the 
defendants, but a fraud claim as well: Perkins only dealt with estoppel; it did not address 
fraud. Consequently, Perkins does not apply to the facts at issue in this case. 
In any event, the trial court failed to properly consider the Youngblood line of cases.l n 
(Youngblood II was decided after briefing had been completed but before oral arguments in 
this case. Mr. Ellison provided the trial court with a copy of Youngblood II during oral 
arguments.113) The Youngblood cases arose out of a situation where an insurer made 
misrepresentations about the scope of an insurance policy, thereby inducing the plaintiff to 
purchase the policy.114 These misrepresentations were made before the plaintiff actually 
purchased the policy.115 When the plaintiff was subsequently injured, however, he discovered 
that his injury was not actually covered by his policy, even though the insurer had made 
representations to him to the contrary at the time of purchase.116 As a result, the plaintiff sued 
his insurer, alleging, among other things, estoppel.117 Although the trial court dismissed the 
112See Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.. 2005 UT App. 154, 111 P.3d 829 
[hereinafter Youngblood I]; Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.. 2007 UT 28, 158 P.3d 
1088 [hereinafter Youngblood II]. 
113Transcript, at 30:3-6. 
114YoungbloodT 2005 UT App. 154, \\ 4-5. 
115IcL 
li6Iit1J8-9. 
U7IMf9, 11. 
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plaintiffs estoppel claim by summary judgment, the appellate courts in Youngblood I and 
Youngblood II eventually reversed the trial court's decision.118 
In Youngblood II, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "the question of whether or not" 
an insured's "reliance on [an] agent's misrepresentations of the scope of coverage under [an 
insurance] policy [is] reasonable ...is one of fact"119 Consequently, the Youngblood II court 
held that "[rjeliance upon an agent's material misrepresentations regarding coverage may or 
may not be reasonable, depending upon the facts of the individual case."120 This holding is 
consistent with the Youngblood I court's previously-issued opinion: "'Reasonable reliance 
must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, and is usually a question for the 
jury to determine.'"121 For this reason, the court in Youngblood I also concluded that, "based 
on [the plaintiffs] deposition testimony and affidavit, there [was] again at least a disputed 
issue of material fact as to whether [the plaintiff] reasonably relied on the representations 
made by [the insurance] agent."122 
Although the misrepresentations that the defendants made to Mr. Ellison were made 
after the Policy was issued, rather than before Mr. Ellison purchased it, these 
l l 8I4 \ 11; Youngblood IL 2007 UT 28, \ 2. 
119YoungbloodIl, 2007 UT28, \ 38 (emphasis added). 
120Id. \ 35 (emphasis added). 
121Youngblood L 2005 UT App. 154, \ 23 (quoting Conder, 739 P.2d at 638) 
(emphases added). 
122kLt26. 
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misrepresentations concerned the continued perpetuation and preservation of the Policy. As 
such, they are similar to those made to the plaintiff in the Youngblood cases, in that the 
misrepresentations in question were made in order to persuade Mr. Ellison to make additional 
payttients toward the Policy. In other words, these misrepresentations were made before Mr. 
Ellison got divorced and before he paid any premiums on the Policy as a newly-divorced 
individual. They were also made before Mr. Ellison concluded that he had successfully 
maintained coverage under the Policy following his divorce. 
Like the plaintiff in the Youngblood cases, Mr. Ellison has provided sworn testimony 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he acted in reasonable 
reliance upon the misrepresentations that were made to him during his conversations with 
defendants' employees. Indeed, the trial court has itself recognized that "Mr. Ellison's 
understanding of the existence of those conversations might be relevant to the reasonableness 
of his conduct."123 Consequently, the trial court's complete reliance upon the Policy's express 
language was improper, inasmuch as there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether 
Mr. Ellison reasonably relied upon the defendants' misrepresentations, and all inferences 
should be construed in Mr. Ellison's favor.124 
l23Transcript, at 61:3-5. 
124See Larsen v. Exclusive Cars. Inc., 2004 UT App. 259,1fl[ 10-11, 297 P.3d 714 
("The trial court erred when it looked chiefly to the sales documents to determine that [the 
plaintiffs] reliance on [the defendant's] oral representations was unreasonable as a matter 
of law. . . . Viewing the totality of the alleged facts in the light most favorable to [the 
plaintiff], a jury could find that he acted reasonably."). 
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V, WHETHER MR. ELLISON SUFFERED DAMAGES IS A GENUINE ISSUE 
OF MATERIAL FACT. 
The trial court dismissed all of Mr. Ellison's claims because it did not believe that Mr. 
Ellison had suffered any damages.125 In the court's own words: 
There is no admissible evidence from which the fact-finder can reasonably 
infer that Sherrie Ellison would have converted her group insurance policy into 
an individual policy, and there is no evidence that Mr. Ellison, rather than 
Sherrie Ellison's estate or heirs, would have been the beneficiaries of that 
conversion policy.126 
For at least the following reasons, the trial court's conclusions regarding Mr. Ellison's 
damages are erroneous: 
First, Mr. Ellison never had a reasonable opportunity to have the Policy converted 
prior to his divorce due to the defendants' improper conduct. By making misrepresentations 
to Mr. Ellison about what was necessary to maintain the Policy, the defendants thereby 
prevented Mr. Ellison from converting the Policy because he had no reason to know or 
believe that such was necessary. The defendants' misrepresentations, in effect, stopped Mr. 
Ellison from conducting any additional research or seeking further information because he 
believed, based upon the defendants' misrepresentations, that he was alright so long as he 
continued to pay the premiums. 
Second, Mr. Ellison provided the trial court with sworn testimony showing that, after 
his wife was diagnosed with cancer, she specifically told Mr. Ellison that she wanted him to 
125R. 648-649. 
126R. 649. 
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continue the Policy and use it for the benefit of their children. Simply because the trial court 
may not have considered such testimony as being sufficiently credible does not change the 
fact that this issue remains disputed. Credibility is a question of fact.127 
Third, Sherrie Ellison's desire to have the Policy remain in effect for the benefit of 
the Ellisons' children is admissible evidence. Statements by an unavailable declarant, such 
as Sherrie Ellison, are not always excluded by the hearsay rule.128 For example, "a statement 
made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent" may be 
admissible.129 Likewise, certain "statements against interest" are also admissible, as 
explained earlier.130 The statements at issue by Sherrie Ellison are admissible under both of 
these scenarios. 
And, fourth, Mr. Ellison suffered damages as a result of the defendants' breach of 
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as discussed in the 
following section. 
127van der Hevde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co.. 845 P.2d 275, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
128Utah R. Evid. 804(b). 
129Id 804(b)(2). 
130Id 804(b)(3). 
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VI. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS ON MR. ELLISON'S CLAIMS FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
A. Breach of Contract. 
As reflected in paragraph 13 of the trial court's order, the trial court dismissed Mr. 
Ellison's breach of contract claims because, according to the court, "[tjhere's no credible 
evidence that the contract provisions were expanded by a, a statement or an action of an 
agent of the insurance company."131 As explained earlier, however, questions concerning the 
credibility of evidence are issues of fact that should be resolved at trial.132 As also explained 
earlier, the evidence Mr. Ellison has submitted is admissible. The trial court, therefore, erred 
by dismissing Mr. Ellison's breach of contract claims. 
The trial court's dismissal of Mr. Ellison's breach of contract claims was also 
erroneous because there are multiple, disputed issues of material fact regarding these claims. 
For example: 
i. There is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the defendants are in 
breach of contract by failing to provide Mr. Ellison with a copy of the Policy. 
l31Transcript, at 62:12-14. 
132van der Heyde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co.. 845 P.2d 275, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
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ii. There is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the County is in breach 
of contract by failing to inform Mr. Ellison of his "right to exercise the Conversion 
Privilege."133 
iii. There is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the defendants are in 
breach of contract by making misrepresentations to Mr. Ellison and providing him with 
erroneous instructions regarding the Policy, as explained earlier. 
Based upon these disputed issues of material fact, summary judgment should not have 
been granted. Instead, the matter should have proceeded to trial so that a jury could have 
considered all of the relevant facts and circumstances in order to determine whether there 
was a breach of contract and/or of a modified contract between the parties. 
B. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
"' A violation of the covenant" of good faith and fair dealing "gives rise to a claim for 
breach of contract.'"134 To determine whether there has been a violation of this covenant, 
courts consider "the contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct of 
the parties."135 In the present case, the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties 
suggest that the defendants' actions were neither fair or in good faith. 
133R. 406-407, 542, 595. 
134PDO Lube Or.. Inc. v. Huben 949 P.2d 792, 797-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991)). 
135Id. (emphasis in original). 
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"Good faith and fair dealing are fact sensitive concepts, and whether there has been 
a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally inappropriate for decision 
as a matter of law."136 Despite this, however, the trial court dismissed Mr. Ellison's claim 
against Hartford for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because, according 
to the trial court, Mr. Ellison's insurance claim was "fairly debatable."137 But whether Mr. 
Ellison's insurance claim was "fairly debatable" ignores the fact that Hartford may have 
acted in bad faith and unfairly in ways other than simply denying Mr. Ellison's claim for 
benefits.138 Indeed, Hartford's denial of Mr. Ellison's insurance claim is only one of the many 
ways that Hartford could have, and did in fact, violate its duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
For example, Hartford violated this duty when it made misrepresentations to Mr. Ellison 
about the Policy's provisions and procedures. Likewise, Hartford also violated its duty of 
good faith and fair dealing by continuing to collect premiums on the Policy from Mr. Ellison 
after his divorce. Consequently, the trial court erred by only considering whether Mr. 
Ellison's claim for benefits was "fairly debatable." Instead, the trial court should have also 
considered whether the facts, together with any reasonable inferences arising therefrom, 
136The Republic Group. Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
137R. 652 (citing Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, 56 P.3d 524). 
138PDO Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huben 949 P.2d 792, 797-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Ellison, suggest that Hartford may have 
violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing in any other ways.139 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court erred by making improper findings of fact, by not considering 
all of the admissible evidence, and by ignoring numerous disputed issues of material fact, the 
trial court's order granting summary judgment for the defendants should be reversed, and this 
matter should be remanded to the trial court so that the parties may continue preparing for 
trial. 
t 
DATED this-2Xday of August, 2008. 
KENNETH PARKINSON, and 
ELIJAH L. MILNE, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Val M. Ellison 
t390rvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT 2, f^ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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ADDENDUM 
Copies of the following materials are attached as appendices to this brief: 
A. Transcript of July 20, 2007 Oral Argument 
B. Signed January 22, 2008 Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of 
Defendants 
C. Ellison Phone Call with Hartford Insurance 
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IN THE FOUPTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROVO COURT 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on July 20, 2007. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
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P-K-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(July 20, 2007) 
THE JUDGE: All right. Let's, let's turn to 
Ellison versus Utah County. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Your Honor, we have— 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: That's okay. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: We have two motions that are 
pending, both defendants have filed motions so just— 
THE JUDGE: We do. How do you want to proceed? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Go ahead, Kristin. I'll be 
(short, unable to decipher). 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Thank you, appreciate it. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Your Honor, Kristin Van Orman on 
behalf of Utah County. 
MR. PARKINSON: Your Honor, just so I'm clear are 
we going to, are we going to let both of them argue or are we 
going to argue both motions separately— 
THE JUDGE: However... I've read all the 
briefing. It's kind of similar arguments. Are you more 
comfortable addressing them one at a time or do you want to 
a, let them both argue and then you respond? How do you want 
to do it? 
MR. PARKINSON: I'm happy to let them both argue 
and then a, let me respond. 
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THE JUDGE: Let's do it that way. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: That's fine. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
ARGUMENT BY MS. VAN ORMAN 
MS. VAN ORMAN: And, Your Honor, I know you've 
read extensive briefing so I'm going to be pretty short on 
this. 
This a, matter arises out of a claim for life 
insurance benefits essentially. Mr. Ellison, the plaintiff 
is, and was a full-time employee of Utah County and had been 
for a number of years. He was married to a woman named 
Sherry Ellison who has since deceased. 
At the time a, before they divorced, they had been 
married for some time, he apparently had a life insurance 
policy, spousal policy on her. Under that policy there is a 
provision, basically it's the kind of policy that you get 
through your employees (sic?) where you can get extra life 
insurance for dependents, the key being they have to be a 
dependent. And once a person gets divorced they are no 
longer a dependent, they don't qualify for that under the 
policy. And what you have to do is you have to get a 
conversion policy. It's a completely separate process. 
And it's not the employee who has the right to get a 
conversion policy, it's the, or the spouse, it's their policy 
to get. 
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THE JUDGE: From the time that they became 
divorced until she became deceased how much time passed? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: A month? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: It was, it was, the divorce was 
finalized in August of 2003 and she passed away on October 
19th, 2003 so a little over a month and a half. 
THE JUDGE: Were there premiums collected from 
Mr. Ellison during that period of time by Utah County? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: I believe that there was a 
deduction through his a, payroll and the payroll deductions 
did continue. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Okay. Basically what happened 
is, well, there is a dispute. And I don't think this is a 
material fact. Mr. Ellison contends that one day prior to 
the divorce, doesn't know what day, that he goes to Utah 
County HR Department and says if I'm going to get a divorce 
can I keep my life insurance on some, on my, on my wife. 
He doesn't know who he spoke with. Nobody from Utah County 
recalls speaking with him. They would have directed him to 
the person in charge of the life insurance. She absolutely 
never spoke with him. He cannot— 
THE JUDGE: Well it's, well it's undisputed that 
there was a conversation with was it Mrs. Bird or someone 
from the, I'm trying to remember the name— 
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MS. VAN ORMAN: That's, that's with the 
insurance— 
THE JUDGE: So she called the insurance company— 
MS. VAN ORMAN: — the insurance company. 
Correct. 
THE JUDGE: — and had the conversation, which 
we've had transcribed. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Right. 
THE JUDGE: We also know that the deductions 
continued. So from his perspective payment was being made. 
Okay. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: But you have a situation here 
where number one, Utah County says we were never put on 
notice of any of this, we don't know anything about this kind 
of conversation. He has a copy of the, the policy. The 
policy clearly says that you can't continue on a former 
spouse. 
Under Utah law, as I'm sure the court is aware, 
you have to rely on what is written in the policy. And he 
is expected to know what is written in the policy. So he 
goes— 
THE JUDGE: Well, I assume he was worried about it 
or he wouldn't have made the contacts and the calls. We know 
he was talking to somebody, at least one person he talked to 
and said can I insure her or not. 
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MS. VAN ORMAN: Right. He talks to somebody at 
least at the insurance company— 
THE JUDGE: Which makes sense. He must, surely 
must have known she was ill. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: He did. He knew he was, he knew 
that she was terminally ill and he wanted to get a divorce. 
I mean, the divorce wasn't even final. So you've got that 
situation. 
There is absolutely no evidence other than his own 
testimony that he spoke with somebody at Utah County. We 
don't know if he even talked to a county employee. It might 
have been somebody in the hallway, it might... He doesn't 
know who he spoke with. Nobody at Utah County recalls any 
of that. So to hold the county responsible a, I just 
don't— 
THE JUDGE: Well what, what do I make of the 
county, of, I mean, the inescapable fact the county 
(inaudible word). The county manages his paycheck, the 
county continued the deductions. The county is the, the 
managing agent for this insurance. Isn't that the way it 
works? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: I believe so. 
THE JUDGE: The HR Department puts it out. So 
they continue to collect the premiums. What difference does 
that make? 
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MS. VAN ORMAN: They did return the premiums once 
they were aware of the situation. 
See what happens, here's, here's how it works. You 
get the automatic deductions, okay. It runs through the 
system. They remember... It was never even brought to 
their attention that look, there's a divorce and goes what I 
have a life insurance policy on my former spouse, we need to 
change this around, don't take any— 
THE JUDGE: What's the— 
MS. VAN ORMAN: — deductions out. 
THE JUDGE: — what's the policy about that kind 
of notification? If an employee becomes divorced a, is 
there a policy that specifies how and when the county should 
be notified to modify the deductions? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: I don't believe that there is a 
set policy. The county was aware of a divorce but the 
county was not... 
Basically what happened is the HR Department became 
aware that there was a divorce that was pending, but they 
weren't aware— 
THE JUDGE: Well, a divorce pending is a lot 
different than a divorce granted. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Correct. And then you also have 
to go with the divorce and say all right now, let's pull all 
of his policies and let's see if it qualifies and if it 
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fits. And if he happened to have this other policy on this 
spouse. 
THE JUDGE: Well— 
MS. VAN ORMAN: I mean, this is something that he 
would need to come to the county with and say look, I have 
this problem, I have this issue how do we resolved it. 
There's— 
THE JUDGE: You're, you're saying because he would 
have knowledge the burden logically should be on him. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Correct. And further than that, 
Your Honor, it would be Sherry, it would be the spouse 
because that is her policy. He did not even... And, and 
that's probably our greatest argument is I don't believe he 
has standing in this case. This is not his policy to 
dispute. This is not... This is something that Sherry 
after the divorce would have to come to Utah County and say 
I have this policy, it's for me to convert, it's for me to 
make the premium payments, it's for me to apply for it in 
the first place, then to make the premiums, and then to 
name a beneficiary. Those are all things that Sherry had to 
do. It could not be done by Mr. Ellison, he didn't have the 
right to do it, it wasn't his policy to do it. It was 
hers. And she didn't do that. 
And the problem we have here is there is no 
evidence and especially my a, co-defense counsel here has 
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pointed out I thought very clearly in his brief that there's 
no admissible evidence, it's all hearsay that she would have 
done any of this. Mr. Ellison says well, I knew her and I 
knew she would have done that. But the problem is is when 
you look at the evidence that's available, in other words, 
the divorce decree that is a very very specific lengthy 
divorce decree, that decree specifies that Ms. Ellison has to 
maintain health insurance, he has to maintain his life 
insurance policies for his children. It says nothing about 
the policy on his wife. 
THE JUDGE: Your position is that even, even if 
she had not passed away if a couple, one of whom is an 
employee of the county has life insurance, they get divorced, 
they say nothing, they continue to pay the premiums for a 
month, a week, a day, a year or 10 years. At some point the 
spouse who was not an employee passes away, at that point 
you're saying that under the contract life insurance doesn't 
continue, what you would do, what you would have to do is 
refund the premiums but not, not recognize life insurance 
because the divorce had happened? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: No. What I'm saying, Your Honor, 
is that you're getting a divorce from somebody and you say 
wait a minute, I, I know what kind of life insurance policies 
I have and I know what policies my spouse— 
THE JUDGE: Yes. But let's, let's— 
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MR. CHRISTIANSEN: — my spouse has. 
THE JUDGE: But let's assume they don't do that. 
What's the consequence of that? 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Well, what they need to do is they 
need to be aware of that. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Because under the policy that, 
that they know that they have they have to look at the policy 
and say okay, she's not going to be a dependent anymore, I 
need to find out what we need to do. 
THE JUDGE: Understood. But let's assume, let's 
assume for my hypothetical that they don't, they just let it 
ride, they let the deductions continue. The employee 
continues to work for the county, continues to pay every 
month for a policy of life insurance. Then the insured 
dies. 
And your position is that because the insured is no 
longer a spouse and, and hasn't been a spouse for some time 
you can't honor that life insurance policy, you would at that 
point refund the premiums because that's when you would find 
out— 
MS. VAN ORMAN: That's when— 
THE JUDGE: — (short inaudible). 
MS. VAN ORMAN: — there's notification. 
Absolutely. And the burden is on the individual or 
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individuals who have the policy to provide that kind of 
notification. That's what the policy requires, that's what 
they are bound by. And if nobody knows what's going on how 
can they change anything. I mean, if the county is notified 
look, there's a divorce and guess what I've got this life 
insurance, I don't want to continue it anymore, or I do want 
to continue it what do we need to do here, then that can set 
things in motion. 
But there's no evidence that that happened. And 
that's the problem. We're stuck in a position, as is the-
life insurance company, that there was no notification 
given. They have to do something, they have to notify. 
And this is Sherry's burden to do that a, because 
it's her policy. She's the one— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative)— 
MS. VAN ORMAN: — who would have to apply for the 
conversion policy. I don't think it's even an automatic 
conversion, I think you have to apply for it. Then she's 
got to affirmatively make the payments, then she's got to 
name the beneficiary. 
And here's, here's the rub on this is you look at a 
divorce decree, and I believe there was a restraining order 
put in place between these folks. This was not an amicable 
divorce. We're jumping to a whole other leap here where 
we're going to now assume that this woman who had a 
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resti a: ning crier aja-.'.s: the plaintiff is going to continue 
on with this insurance policy and name him as a 
beneficiary? That is just such speculation. There's no 
evidence as to that except from Mr. Ellison's own testimony 
that well, I knew her and I think that's what she would do. 
Maybe she would name the children directly. Maybe she would 
name her parents or a brother or a sister. We don't know. 
But certainly to give him the power to bring this kind of an 
action there's just no evidence to support that. 
And so, Your Honor, I think that's the county's 
position. I think that there's no evidence as to that he 
even spoke to anybody at Utah County with authority to alert 
them of this type of position. If they were alerted then 
there would be some kind of a change in deducting the 
payroll. Once they were alerted then they rectified the 
problem and at least gave them the, the money back. 
But this isn't his case to bring, this would have 
been Sherry's, these was her decisions. And now he's in a 
position where he can't bring any evidence and so that's why 
we believe we're entitled to summary judgment. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. CHRISTIANSEN 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Good morning, Your Honor. It's 
nice to see you again. 
My name is Erik Christiansen and I represent 
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Hartford Life. 
I'm going to do this a little bit differently. 
I'm going to kind of run through each of the specific claims 
that have been made against Hartford and talk about why we 
believe Hartford is entitled to summary judgment on each 
claim. 
And as a remainder there are four claims pled 
against Hartford here. There's a claim for breach of 
contract being the insurance contract, there's a claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, there's a claim for fraud and a claim for 
estoppel. So those are the four claims that have been made 
against Hartford by the plaintiff. 
The... Let me talk a little bit about what the 
policy terms are. This is a group life insurance policy. 
What Hartford does is issues a policy to Utah County, and 
Utah County then allows people to pay into that and become a 
part of that policy or not. And each month what happens is 
Utah County sends a bulk check to us and they administer the 
policy. We handle the claims handling. 
The policy term says that it covers dependents, and 
a dependent is defined in the policy as a spouse or an 
unmarried child. So in order to be a dependent covered by 
the policy you have to be a spouse or an unmarried child. 
It's undisputed that under the terms of the policy 
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once Sherry Ellison was no longer a spouse she was no longer 
a dependent and, therefore, not covered under the terms of 
the policy. 
There is a provision in the policy that allows 
conversion. And that's that magic word here in the, in the 
policy. And what that says is that if you're going to 
become a non-dependent, if you're a spouse that becomes an 
ex-spouse, you can convert and have your own policy in your 
own name provided you do a couple of things. First is the 
policy provides you have to provide written application to 
Hartford, second you have to provide that written 
application within 31 days of the date that you become an 
ex-spouse. So under the unambiguous terms of the insurance 
policy if Sherry Ellison wanted to have a life insurance 
policy with Hartford she would have to fill out an 
application, submit it to Hartford, and do that within 31 
days of the day of her divorce. There's no dispute in the 
record that that wasn't done. So just from a contractual 
standpoint there's no dispute that those terms of the 
contract were not complied with. So Hartford had no 
contractual obligation to honor a claim that there was life 
insurance on Sherry Ellison. 
The theory that plaintiffs have come up with to try 
to get around that is really the heart of where we are in the 
case. They're, they've come up with a couple different 
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theories. The first theory is that there was some kind of a 
modification of this contract, that somehow the conversation 
that took place between Mr. Ellison and Ms. Daly, the 
Hartford customer representative person— 
THE JUDGE: I said Bird. But that's what it is, 
it's Ms. Daly. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Ms. Daly. That somehow that 
modified the written contract. And we've set forth in our 
brief a number of reasons why that modification theory 
fails. 
First of all, there's no evidence in the record 
anywhere that Hartford knowingly was modifying the terms of 
that contract. Look very carefully at that transcript, I 
think you'll conclude that's not a knowing modification of a 
written policy term life insurance contract with Utah 
County. 
And the second point on that is really important. 
That contract exists between Hartford and Utah County. The 
only people who can bargain to modify that contract would be 
Hartford and Utah County. And there's no evidence anywhere 
in the record that Utah County bargained with Hartford to 
modify the terms of that contract. 
Mr. Ellison is not a party to that contract. He's 
a participant in a plan but he's not a contracting party. 
Thus there is no evidence of any meeting of the 
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minds of the contracting parties to modify that written 
contract. So we think the modification theory fails as a 
matter of law given the position of the parties with respect 
to that insurance contract. 
The, a couple other little arguments we make in our 
brief on the modification theory are that any modification of 
a written agreement must be spelled out with sufficient 
definiteness to be enforceable. I submit there's not 
evidence here that that standard which is found in the Pack 
versus Case case has been satisfied. 
Moreover, there was no consideration for the 
modification a, Hartford wasn't paid anything in addition 
t o — 
THE JUDGE: I recognize Hartford says that. But 
the one thing we do know, or one of the few things we do know 
is that money was taken out of his check for the premiums. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: By Utah County. And we don't, 
we don't have visibility to that. Because they are the 
administrator of the policy and we just get one bulk check, 
we don't know who is not covered— 
THE JUDGE: Well— 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: It's their obligation to do 
that. 
THE JUDGE: Well, not knowing you got 
consideration is different than not getting any 
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ability to go get the policy and through reasonable 
diligence can read the policy and see what it says. Very 
important here. Because plaintiff never asked Hartford for 
a copy of the policy, the plaintiff did not ask Utah County 
for a copy of the policy. The only time he did ask anybody, 
and it was Utah County, for a copy of the policy was after 
his ex-wife had already passed away. All he had to do in 
order to learn what the terms of the policy were was to call 
up Utah County or walk in their, their office and say I'd 
like to look at the policy to see what I do in this 
situation. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Perkins versus Great 
West Life has held in that circumstance he cannot claim 
fraud. 
Now, there's another case that the court, the Utah 
Supreme Court issued which makes that clear again. It's 
called the Youngblood versus Auto Owners case. And it draws 
a distinction. It says if representations are made before 
the policy is obtained those can give rise to fraud claims, 
if it's a fraud in the inducement about what's going to be 
covered by the policy and it turns out the policy is 
different than how it was represented when it was sold that 
can give rise to a fraud and inducement claim. The 
representations made after the issuance of the policy are not 
actionable as fraud. And those two cases together make that 
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very clear that that's the law in Utah. 
The next point on fraud is there's no 
representation made by Hartford of a presently existing fact 
which is a requirement for a fraud claim. At best giving 
the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt of Ms.. Daly's 
representations, all she's saying is she thinks in the 
future that insurance can be obtained if premiums are paid on 
it. That's giving them every benefit of the doubt of that 
transcript, which I don't think that's what that transcript 
says. But that's a representation about the future, it's -
not about today and what's happening today. 
And the Republic Group versus (inaudible) case 
and a lot of other cases say that you have to have 
representation of a presently existing fact to give rise to a 
fraud claim. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. And I guess the, the point in 
fact that I'm struggling with the most and, and was reflected 
I think in my area of questions as that you read the Daly 
conversation and a, and if I construe inferences against the 
moving parties here, then I say what was Mr. Ellison 
thinking, what was going on this his head, what, what 
conclusions would a layperson engaging in that conversation 
come away with. Here's a guy who has insurance on an 
existing spouse, it's been going along, the money is being 
taken out. He calls and says can the insurance continue, 
PAGE 21 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
sure if you pay the premiums, and you've got to fill out a 
paper, better call somebody. Well that's in response just to 
well I need something in writing for the court. Well, 
you've got to call somebody. Okay. Continues to get his 
paycheck, it's coming out. Well, they said we could continue 
if I keep paying the payments, must be still going. 
I mean, isn't that an existing fact that the, the, 
the fact being the existence of a contractual relationship, 
the existence of an ongoing policy doesn't, couldn't we infer 
that he drew from that conversation that there was in fact an 
ongoing policy of insurance to cover his now divorced 
ex-wife? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I think you could make that 
argument. But I think it was really the statements were 
about in the future, can I continue ib, can I continue it 
when we get divorced. The divorce hadn't happened yet. And 
I don't think that's disputed that there wasn't a divorce 
yet. 
THE JUDGE: At the time of that call. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: At the time of that call. So 
I think that's, that's the distinction there. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The other really important 
part of the fraud argument is there's no scienter here. 
There's no evidence anywhere in this case of fraudulent 
PAGE 22 
1 
2 
3 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
intent. They don't even make an effort to marshal any 
evidence of fraudulent intent. 
All they say really is that well, premiums were 
paid so they must have been motivated to collect the premiums 
by saying, you know, the statements about what could happen 
when they get divorced. That's not enough to satisfy the 
high hurdle of scienter. 
And I think it's really important to go back and 
look at two very important pieces of evidence that are before 
the court on how this issue is administered. The 
administration policy of Utah County, their own policy which 
is before the court says in it, and I quote: 
That your responsibilities... 
You being Utah County, 
... include notifying employees of 
their right to exercise the conversion 
privilege. 
It's Utah County's obligation to do that. It's not 
Hartford's. We don't administer it, they administer the 
policy. So it's not our burden to have any conversations 
with the plaintiff about this. It's Utah County's 
obligation, duty according to the administration policy. 
Secondly, Peggy Poulsen's (phonetic) own testimony, 
and she's a Utah County person in charge of this, she 
admitted that it was Utah County's duty to discusses 
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conversion with employees. Again, the administration of the 
policy is Utah County's obligation, it's not Hartford. 
THE JUDGE: Well, what's the consequence if Utah 
County failed m either or both of those duties? Does that, 
does the, does the consequence of that failure fall upon the 
employee or does it fall upon the county? Wouldn't then, 
wouldn't there, shouldn't the court in that circumstance find 
coverage but then allow you a cause of action against the 
county saying you didn't do your job and this is what it cost 
us? I mean, isn't that a contract dispute between you and 
the county? Why does the employee enter in there? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: No. I don't think there's, I 
don't think that's how it works. I think that a, I think 
that how it works is that the relationship for administration 
of the plan is between the county and that person, and so 
there's no duty on our part, there's no relationship on our 
part. 
And I'll let Ms. Van Orman discuss her arguments of 
why that doesn't cause a cause of action between the county 
and the plaintiff. 
THE JUDGE: I, what I'm, what I'm struggling with 
is that you're saying you escape a duty— 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: By contract. 
THE JUDGE: — because the county failed in the 
duty you, you escape an obligation to Ellison if there is 
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o.ie, you, }G~ escape your obligation to Ellison because the 
county failed in their obligation to Ellison. I'm not sure I 
follow the logic of that. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, I'm not sure that 
Ms. Van Orman would say they failed. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I — 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I think she would say they 
didn't have notice of, that they didn't have— 
THE JUDGE: I appreciate that. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: — the opportunity to discuss 
conversion. 
THE JUDGE: But you're, you're saying gee it's 
their duty to tell him. And they, and apparently they 
didn't. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well if they, they— 
THE JUDGE: Why does it matter? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: — had the opportunity to do 
so it was their duty and— 
THE JUDGE: And the only reason it could be 
relevant in your argument is if it didn't happen. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Right. Right. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. Finally on the fraud 
argument, and I'm going to try and move this along, is that 
there are no damages here for Mr. Ellison. And that's what 
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THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: And that's because a converted 
policy belongs to Sherry Ellison. Under the clear 
unambiguous terms of the group policy here, the only person 
who contractually can get that policy would be Sherry. And 
it's undisputed that she didn't convert the policy. It's 
undisputed that there's no admissible evidence that even if 
she had converted the policy that she would have named 
Mr. Ellison as the beneficiary of that. No evidence 
whatsoever. No response even in our brief to the 
evidentiary objections we made to the self-serving 
statements made by Mr. Ellison on that. 
And so I agree if, if there would be any potential 
claim here, and I don't think there is, it potentially might 
belong to the estate of Sherry Ellison. But it wouldn't 
belong to her husband. He doesn't have standing, he hasn't 
suffered the damages. Okay? 
Finally, just keep in mind that the burden here for 
plaintiffs on fraud is clear and convincing evidence. I 
don't think they've come anywhere close to satisfying that 
high burden that existed for (short inaudible). 
The real heart of this case really comes down to 
the estoppel claim. I think that's where the plaintiff 
spends the most of their time in their opposition briefs, and 
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I think that's really where the court has to dig into both 
the Perkins case and the Youngblood case to decide that 
claim. I think that's the claim where the real fight is. 
And the Perkins case makes it very clear that m Utah 
estoppel, that doctrine, cannot be used to expand coverage 
beyond the policy terms. In other words, you can't rewrite 
the terms of a policy under Utah law using the doctrine of 
estoppel. And the Perkins court says in the insurance 
context quote: 
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be used 
to bring risks which were not covered by 
the terms of the policy within coverage 
of the policy. Close quote. 
And again, the Youngblood and Perkins cases make 
the same distinction I talked about before and that is that 
estoppel can be used for representations that are preissuance 
of the policy but not representations made after the policy 
is in place. And again, the representations here are 
clearly made after the Hartford Utah County policy is in 
place. 
There's also case law we've given again which says 
that to give rise to estoppel the alleged representations 
must be very definite and very specific. That comes from a 
Rodawes (phonetic) case out of Massachusetts. 
And finally we make an argument a, I just wanted 
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to bring it to the court's attention, that Ms. Daly's 
(phonetic) statements cannot be reasonably held to have bound 
Hartford because she made it very clear in her statement that 
this wasn't her area, it wasn't her department and she 
referred him elsewhere. 
THE JUDGE: What's the difference between that 
argument about Ms. Daly's (phonetic) conversation in the 
context of estoppel and that argument in the context of 
fraud? Burden of proof? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes, I agree. 
Finally, the last claim that's pled against 
Hartford is a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Again— 
THE JUDGE: Well, before you move to that. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: What's the relationship of damages to 
the estoppel claim? It seems to me that a,— 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: They want the— 
THE JUDGE: — necessary proof for, for, to 
recover on estoppel? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: It is, it is. It is as well, 
Your Honor. Thank you for reminding me of that. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes. And so I meant that 
damages argument to apply to all of the claims. 
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THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The last claim that's pled is 
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. And as Your Honor knows Utah law on that interprets 
that as not a tort claim but a contract claim that follows 
from the insurance contract. Utah has a defense that 
insurance companies invoke which applies here, and that is 
where the claim is fairly debatable, in other words, where 
like mind could say well, I could see where Hartford has an 
argument and I can say where the plaintiff has an argument 
there's no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. We submit not only is there, is the claim 
fairly debatable but it's barred by the unambiguous terms of 
the policy, so it's not even fairly debatable, it's crystal 
clear that there's no contract claim. 
So with those arguments in mind we really believe 
that under the facts and circumstances here Hartford is 
entitled to a summary judgment and we would request that be 
entered. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. PARKINSON 
MR. PARKINSON: Your Honor, if I might I think I'm 
a, of course, by accepting this I get hit by all sides and 
have a lot of things, a lot of issues to cover. But I think 
if I, if I, if I can I'd like to maybe start with a, the 
Perkins Youngblood analysis. 
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And the court should be awaie that the Youngblood 
case and the Perkins case were both Court of Appeals cases. 
Since the initial briefing of this case the Supreme Court has 
weighed in in the Youngblood case and I think it 
substantially turns the analysis on the Perkins Youngblood 
cases. I have a copy of that case here. 
THE JUDGE: When was it decided? 
MR. PARKINSON: It was decided on March 23rd. 
The Youngblood case, by the way, was a case where 
a fellow went to go apply for automobile insurance, he was 
doing it under the name of his company, he had a 
conversations with a, a person who was selling him the 
policy, they had discussions about the policy. And in that 
he was a, told that he should get this underinsured motorist 
coverage because that would protect him if he were crossing 
the street and he got ran over by someone. 
By a reading of the policy a, if you read the 
policy, and I think both sides eventually conceded this, if 
you read the policy they a, he wouldn't be covered because 
he was buying it as a, as a company and it would only apply 
to him if he purchased it as an individual if he was crossing 
the street and got ran over by someone. Well what, of 
course, is going to happen that brings us to the court is he 
was in a parking lot and got run over by someone and then 
we're here before the court. 
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And I think it was agreed, like I say, that the 
plan language of the insurance policy didn't extend 
protection to him under these circumstances. 
And then there was raised the issue of equitable 
estoppel and. and the estoppel line of cases, Perkins was 
discussed, the Youngblood a, case was discussed. And the 
court makes a distinction between equitable estoppel and 
promissory estoppel and there's a lot of discussion about 
that, about how equitable estoppel tends to be more of a 
shield. And the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court 
cases had been, had been muddled about their decisions on 
this, or the appellate cases had been muddled on their 
decisions about this, and promissory estoppel was more of a 
sword. And there was a lot of discussion about the 
differences in a promissory estoppel about whether it's a 
presently existing fact or a promise on a, on a future 
existing fact. 
THE JUDGE: Well it's clear isn't it that the 
Youngblood case in, in either court was essentially an 
allegation that a misrepresentation was made to the client so 
that they would purchase the insurance, and that was the 
circumstance. 
MR. PARKINSON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: And, and the summary judgment for the 
a, was affirmed because? 
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MR. PARKINSON: Summary judgment was, summary-
judgment by the appellate court in Youngblood was 
overturned. They sent, they sent it back and then it w a s — 
THE JUDGE: This was, this was summary judgment in 
favor of? 
MR. PARKINSON: The a, the company brought, the 
insurance company brought a, a motion for summary judgment— 
THE JUDGE: The trial court says— 
MR. PARKINSON: The trial court grants that. 
THE JUDGE: — insurance company wins. 
MR. PARKINSON: It goes to the Court of Appeals. 
THE JUDGE: Court of Appealssays overturned. 
MR. PARKINSON: Overturned. 
THE JUDGE: Supreme Court says no, the insurance 
company wins. 
MR. PARKINSON: No. The Supreme Court says it's 
still overturned— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. PARKINSON: — but they use a different 
analysis. And maybe I've taken too long to get to that. 
But just what they've done is they've eliminated the 
difference between promissory estoppel and equitable 
estoppel. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. PARKINSON: And the elements of estoppel, now 
PAGE 32 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
particularly now this might not apply m a non-insurance 
context, that's a little fuzzy m here. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. PARKINSON: But m paragraph 25 page five a, 
it describes what the elements are that courts should 
consider after, after the second Youngblood case. It says, 
When an agent makes a material 
representation to the prospective insured 
as to the scope of coverage or other 
important policy benefits— 
THE JUDGE: Stop right there. Do we have a 
prospective insured here? Do we have an agent? I mean 
who, who is the agent and who is the prospective insured? 
I mean the representation that's here is as to whether 
there's ongoing insurance so how does this, how does this 
case apply? 
MR. PARKINSON: Well this, first this is the line 
of cases that they are relying on to get, to a say that it 
overcomes our, our decision here. But I think he, it is a, 
and I think when you read the whole case I think it's clear 
that they are saying that it doesn't matter where in this 
process that these statements are made, that if there are 
material representations made by someone with authority to do 
so a, and you reasonably rely on those representations, then 
you can enforce that contract. 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, well let's— 
MR. PARKINSON: You can enforce that claim. 
THE JUDGE: Who was the person in a position to 
make the representations and what was the reliance here? 
MR. PARKINSON: Okay. There are, and if I can I 
want to go over this factual aspect and include the county in 
it as well. There are three separate representations made 
here. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. PARKINSON: And I think it's easy to get lost 
and forget that. 
First, in both of the a, there's one that's 
confirmed in writing that we have the transcript of, and the 
other two representations a, are supported by the 
transcript. 
The first statement was from the county. 
Mr. Ellison testified that he went to the county and talked 
with someone in personnel and asked what he needed to do. 
They said all you need to do is keep paying a, keep paying on 
your policy and you'll continue to have coverage. 
THE JUDGE: And, and the only evidence we have 
of that is Ellison's as statement that somebody told him 
that. 
MR. PARKINSON: That's, that's not correct 
actually. 
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THE JUDGE: What else do we have? 
MR. PARKINSON: Because we have this transcript of 
the insurance telephone call that he made afterwards. So he 
has a the first conversation with the person from Utah 
County. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. PARKINSON: And this is all long before, this 
is a, long before Ms. Ellison dies, had the first 
conversation— 
THE JUDGE: Before— 
MR. PARKINSON: — and what does he say— 
THE JUDGE: And indeed it's before they are 
divorced. 
MR. PARKINSON: Indeed it's before they are 
divorced. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. PARKINSON: And what does he say? Okay. I 
guess I work for Utah County government and so you guys 
apparently have taken over our life insurance here. And my 
wife and I are getting a divorce. But the personnel told me 
that you can continue the insurance on your spouse even if 
you get divorced. Is this accurate? S o — 
THE JUDGE: How does that corroborate? 
MR. PARKINSON: And he tells them when he has no 
reason to do so that he got this information from Utah County 
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and that he's spoken with the personnel people and that he 
was given this number and told to call them and talk with 
them about his insurance policy issue. 
THE JUDGE: Did, maybe that he had the phone, I 
mean, it's the same source so same source can't corroborate 
itself. So I'm, I'm reaching for what in that, what part of 
the Daly (phonetic) call corroborates Ellison's claim that he 
talked to someone at the county? 
MR. PARKINSON: Well he said, he said that 
personnel told me that you can continue insurance— 
THE JUDGE: Well, he said it twice. 
MR. PARKINSON: — insurance on your spouse. 
THE JUDGE: He said it twice. But what I'm 
looking for is what is there that, that independently 
corroborates that statement that he's making? 
MR. PARKINSON: Well I, I think it independently 
corroborates it by virtue of the time in which he makes the 
statement, which he would have no incentive to make something 
up or to, he's just trying to find out what to do on 
insurance. He tells them I talked with the county and a, 
and— 
THE JUDGE: So hearsay becomes reliable because 
the hearsay declarant a, is a reliable person? Aren't we 
looking for something outside the bearer of the hearsay that 
would corroborate? Isn't that the nature of 
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corroboration? 
MR. PARKINSON: v'oli, in my mind this is helpful 
in a, in understanding that he did talk to the personnel, 
I'm— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. 
MR. PARKINSON: I'm not sure if I'm, if I'm— 
THE JUDGE: So you've got, you've got— 
MR. PARKINSON: — missing your thinking 
process. He, he talks with them, he's testified that he's 
talked with them. And then there's another source that talks 
about how he's talked with them, admittedly that is his, that 
is himself but it's before he has any incentive t o — 
THE JUDGE: You said, you said— 
MR. PARKINSON: — to make anything up. 
THE JUDGE: You said there were three 
representations. The third is? 
MR. PARKINSON: The third, the third is that as a, 
was discussed a, in the end she gives him another number, 
another person to talk to and transfers him over to that 
person. And he testifies that he talked to this other person 
and received a, a third corroboration that that is the 
policy. So h e — 
THE JUDGE: Is this a person that we've been able 
to identify or find? 
MR. PARKINSON: We don't, we don't know who that 
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person is. We don't have any evidence other than the 
conversation here and Mr. Ellison's testimony that he talked 
with a third person and those, and that other person at 
Hartford also stated that all he needed to do was to continue 
paying on the policy. 
THE JUDGE: If it occurred, all three of these 
representations were at a time when a, his wife was alive and 
still his wife. 
MR. PARKINSON: Correct. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. PARKINSON: Correct. 
THE JUDGE: And, and these representations induced 
him to do what? 
MR. PARKINSON: Those representations, by virtue 
of those representations he was induced to continue to pay 
premiums because that was all that was necessary for him to 
recover under the insurance policy. And that's what he 
did. 
Now, the Youngblood court kind of goes through the 
analysis said, the analysis of this, and it says on the one 
hand a, determined in paragraph 3 4 — 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. PARKINSON: ... a determination of 
reasonableness is not based on the 
subjective state of mind of the person 
PAGE 38 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
claiming he was misled, but rather it is 
based on an objective test what would a 
reasonable person conclude under these 
circumstances. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. PARKINSON: It's our contention that with that 
type of standard it definitely becomes a question of fact for 
a jury to decide what would a reasonable person do. In 
paragraph 35 it says reliant upon— 
THE JUDGE: So, so you can never have summary 
judgment on a reasonable person issue? 
MR. PARKINSON: Well, no. I, I think you probably 
could. In paragraph 35 I think it makes it clear that in 
this case that would be inappropriate. Reliance upon an 
agent's material misrepresentations regarding coverage may or 
may not be reasonable depending upon the facts of the 
individual case. 
THE JUDGE: Well, and what they've told me is that 
in, in a situation where it isn't the victim of the 
misrepresentation being, entering into insurance contract 
(inaudible word, away from mic) the inducement, it's where 
the person has or has clear and ready access to the, to the 
terms of the policy and the representation is as to what 
that policy says when it's, it's as a matter of law under 
Utah precedent, Perkins specifically, it's not reasonable for 
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zhaz person to have relied or. what the agent said instead of 
reading the contract that's available to them. 
MR. PARKINSON: That was— 
THE JUDGE: That's what Perkins says. Does 
Youngblood overturn Perkins? 
MR. PARKINSON: That's what, that's what happened 
in Youngblood. 
THE JUDGE: But— 
MR. PARKINSON: In Youngblood he had the policy 
available to him. He had a copy of the policy. In this 
case a, Mr. Ellison did not have a copy of the policy 
contrary to prior representations, he didn't have a copy of 
the policy. Youngblood had a copy of the policy. A clear 
reading of the policy acknowledged by both sides provided 
that he had no coverage under the circumstances. 
THE JUDGE: You don't think that makes a 
difference that in Youngblood they specifically say, 
... the party who reasonably relied on 
the misrepresentations in buying the 
coverage. 
I'm looking at paragraph 39. Isn't, isn't that 
quite different than this circumstance? 
MR. PARKINSON: I don't think so. First, he's 
buying the coverage every time he continues to pay that 
policy, every time he continues to pay on that policy he's 
PAGE 40 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
buying that coverage. He's getting that coverage. He a, 
he knows about it. And this is a case where a. a, the 
person had that policy and looked at it and, and/or I 
shouldn't say he looked at it, he didn't, he acknowledged 
that he didn't look at it. 
THE JUDGE: Well, what do you claim for damages? 
MR. PARKINSON: With respect to damages a, 
Mr. Ellison paid for a particular coverage, he worked for 
that coverage, a, he a, he relied on statements that were 
made to him, and he should be entitled to receive that 
coverage. 
THE JUDGE: Well it's not cover... The policy, 
after the divorce the policy is hers, it's not his, is it? 
MR. PARKINSON: We go to the, we go to the 
statements that they are talking about. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. PARKINSON: They're saying all those should 
not be a, that those statement should not be admitted— 
THE JUDGE: Even, even— 
MR. PARKINSON: — they say there's n o — 
THE JUDGE: Even if we say that there was a policy 
that continued and he paid the premiums, what could he 
recover in this lawsuit? He wouldn't be entitled to the 
proceeds from the insurance. He's, he's not related to the 
decedent, he's not, she's not his dependent, he's not a 
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beneficiary to the policy. What does he gee? 
MR. PARKINSON: Well, and I think that's where the 
estoppel argument is particularly a, important here because 
they should be estopped from denying him the benefits of the 
coverage because they made representations that he reasonably 
relied on or that there is at least a factual issue about 
whether he reasonably relied on those, on those 
representations. 
THE JUDGE: Well, so the representations is not 
only that, that the coverage could continue but that the 
beneficiary relationship would continue as if there had been 
no divorce? 
MR. PARKINSON: Yes. He wanted, that's what he 
was calling about. He wanted to know— 
THE JUDGE: Gosh, I didn't see that in the 
conversation. Can you, can you direct me to that? I — 
MR. PARKINSON: All right. 
THE JUDGE: It's exhibit, which one— 
MR. PARKINSON: I don't know the exhibit number. 
THE JUDGE: We'll find it. They are all nicely 
tabbed, nicely tabbed exhibits. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I think it's Tab 8, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Eight? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes. 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. Very well. Okay. 
MR. PARKINSON: All right. A — 
THE JUDGE: I am (short inaudible) calling from 
Utah. Now what I'm looking for is a representation not only 
that the insurance policy continued, can continue but that in 
spite of the divorce Mr. Ellison would continue to be a 
beneficiary, which is contrary to the clear terms of the 
policy. So if he's going to be estopped it seems to me that 
there's got to be representation that that's going to 
happen. And I did not see it. But if you can— 
MR. PARKINSON: Well I think it's, at first near 
the top half the paragraph that starts with okay seems to be 
a, kind of the important paragraph here. 
THE JUDGE: I'm sorry. Where are we? 
MR. PARKINSON: The paragraph that starts with 
okay under the paragraph that starts, that is the word ya. 
THE JUDGE: (Inaudible word), let me find it. 
About the middle of the first page? 
MR. PARKINSON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: You guys apparently have 
taken over our life insurance. My wife 
and I are getting a divorce. Personnel 
told me that— 
MR. PARKINSON: Yes, this is the paragraph. 
THE JUDGE: — you can continue insurance 
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on your spouse even if you get divorced. 
MR. PARKINSON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: I believe so, yes. I 
haven't heard anything as to why. I 
think that's your option if you want to, 
if you want to, they're going to do 
payroll deducting for her so if you want 
to keep her on there that's fine. 
Okay. And reading all of the inferences so if you 
eep deducting and paying the premiums it can 
Now why there isn't a letter stating so for the 
You filled out a health statement? 
We did it a long time ago. 
We don't administer the plan. 
You know what, I'm going to transfer 
you to another number that may be able to 
help you and hopefully they can. If 
they can't, you know, feel free to call 
be back and we'll research it further to 
see if we can help you. 
Takes a name, takes a number, that's the end. 
I just, I'm not seeing what you're telling me is 
!m sorry. 
MR. PARKINSON: Well, I think that when you a 
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construe all of the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party when you read that first paragraph that you 
started on— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative)— 
MR. PARKINSON: — where he says but personnel 
told me that you can continue insurance on your spouse even 
if you get divorced, he's putting himself in the place of you 
when he's stating that. I think that's, I think that's clear 
from the, from the context, and at least it meets the 
requirement of creating an issue of fact. If they want to 
argue that he's talking about her continuing the, that she's 
the you here a, that's continuing the policy after the 
divorce, and I think that a, they can make that argument. 
But it's a factual argument, it's not a matter of law. I 
think the, that it creates issues of fact that need to be 
decided by the fact-finder. 
THE JUDGE: Well, do you think Perkins to that 
extent was overturned by Youngblood? Do you think Perkins 
tells me a, that the Youngblood principle, or excuse me, do 
you think the Youngblood tells me that the Perkins principle 
that a, a representation about a contract not, not a 
contract being purchased, but a contract in existence which 
is either in the position of or readily available to the 
insured, that the terms of that contract can actually be 
modified by the representations of an agent? That's it's 
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1 reasonable for an insured to rely upon the statements of the 
2 agent when that contract is in existence and is readily 
3 available, and your position is that Youngblood changes 
4 that? 
5 MR. PARKINSON: Paragraph 35 and 36,,. 3 6 — 
6 THE JUDGE: Okay. 
7 MR. PARKINSON: — says in the second Youngblood 
8 that, 
9 The law holds insurance agents to 
10 accurately representing policy provisions 
11 and honestly answering consumer 
1 2 questions. 
13 THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
14 MR. PARKINSON: Agents who are not 
15 trained to act in complete honesty and 
16 integrity in their interactions with a 
17 consumer, or who simply refuse to do so, 
18 place themselves and their principals at 
19 risk. 
2 0 THE JUDGE: Yes, and— 
21 MR. PARKINSON: The law will hold both 
22 principal and agent liable for 
23 misrepresentations upon which consumers 
24 reasonably rely. 
25 THE JUDGE: I guess the concern I have here is I 
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think you have to take that paragraph in the context of the 
Youngblood case. When it says agent, the agent in the 
Youngblood case was an agent who was selling the insurance 
and was causing the insured to become insured. That's 
really a different person than Mrs. Daly (phonetic). 
Ms. Daly (phonetic) isn't a person that's selling insurance, 
isn't trying to convince him to join up, isn't telling him 
what he will get if he pays, she's not creating the contract 
on behalf of the company. It's really a different 
relationship, isn't it? 
MR. PARKINSON: I don't think so. Because this is 
really he wants to know what do I do to a, to preserve this 
policy after a divorce, and he talks to the county who has 
never provided him with a policy who has, who according to 
the contract has a duty to tell him of the conversion 
privilege and the, and the testimony is that they haven't 
informed him of the conversion privilege. Who a... And 
then he, he calls Hartford and talks to two separate 
individuals about what he's supposed to do a, and he's 
told all you need to do is continue paying on the policy. 
And, and it is really in effect an entirely new policy. 
And I, and the court in Youngblood, the Supreme 
Court in Youngblood did take away that distinction between 
the equitable estoppel and the promissory estoppel and 
there's just estoppel. 
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THE JUDGE: Now, it seems to me, and if I 
remember the facts incorrectly please correct me, but the 
representation is that the county has a written policy a, 
regarding these insurance contracts that they are available 
upon request. And I, as I recall there's no testimony, 
there's no evidence from anyone that Mr. Ellison every asked 
for or made an attempt to look at that written policy. Is 
that accurate? 
MR. PARKINSON: I have no recollection, and I, I 
do not believe that the county had a policy that they're, had 
a written policy that they're available upon request. If 
they do maybe Ms. Van Orman can show you that. I do not 
recall that. 
I do know that he didn't have a policy. This was 
a fairly recent changeover from Company A to Company B within 
at least the last year. 
I do know that they do have these benefit fairs 
that county employees can go to a, where they can wander 
through and, and pick up things that are available, so to 
that extent a, there may have been a benefit there at which 
he could have wandered through and picked up something. But 
I don't believe there's any testimony that a policy was 
available at that benefits fair or that he was informed that 
he had the right to ask for the policy at any time. 
He went and called the county, asked what he 
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should do, he wanted to get further a, ha '\-":Qc] to 
strengthen that, he called Hartford and talked with two 
separate people. And he got the number that he got from 
Hartford. Now they're, Hartford is claiming this is the 
wrong department. Again that kind of, again it just shows 
how this whole thing is so intertwined and you, I really 
think the county and Hartford both need to stay in this 
because they, they are so at this timely intertwined in this 
case that a, letting go one of them where they're kind of 
pointing fingers at the other, the county is saying, you 
know, Hartford is the one that makes these decisions, not us, 
and a, Hartford is saying the county is the one who is 
responsible for sharing this information. 
THE JUDGE: So to recap, your theory of damages is 
that not only was there a contract created by the, by the 
conduct of the both county and Hartford agents, it was a 
contract that continued the insurance coverage and 
transferred and created a designation of beneficiary to be 
Mr. Ellison. 
MR. PARKINSON: That's correct. That's 
correct. 
And the information with respect to the discussion 
with Ms. Ellison is admissible. It would be, and I don't 
know if I've talked about this or not, it would certainly be 
a statement against her, her pecuniary interests and would be 
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the type of a, would meet one of the exceptions to the 
hearsay rule and is admissible in this case. 
THE JUDGE: Well, and you think that those facts 
would satisfy the clear and convincing standard for fraud? 
MR. PARKINSON: I think those facts at the very 
least present a question of fact. I bhink when you talk with 
a, a layperson about this case, somebody who has gone to 
three separate people in authority and he had reasons to 
believe, I believe that applying this Youngblood case they'll 
say that he did what was reasonable in the case. I believe 
that a jury— 
THE JUDGE: Well, I mean, you've got a two step 
problem with the two, at least two of those 
representations. If we're going to look at the 
reasonableness of Mr. Ellison's actions then what he heard or 
what he thought he heard is relevant to how he acted. But 
you've also got to prove that the representations were in 
fact made. And you have to prove that by competent 
evidence. And it can't be hearsay. 
So what have you got outside Mr. Ellison's hearsay 
declarations that somebody told me that to establish that in 
fact those other two representations were made? 
MR. PARKINSON: Statements of the party, party 
opponent in both cases. Statements against interest in both 
cases. 
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THE JUDGE: By whom? 
MR. PARKINSON: By the county personnel and a, by 
Ms. Daly (phonetic) and by the other person at Hartford that 
a — 
THE JUDGE: Well, they deny that they ever 
occurred. 
MR. PARKINSON: — he spoke with. And this is 
a... And also Ms. Daly's (phonetic) conversation is a 
business record kept in the ordinary— 
THE JUDGE: Ms. Daly's (phonetic) conversation 
we've got a transcript of that, you know, I don't have a 
problem with— 
MR. PARKINSON: Kept in the ordinary course of 
business. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. I'm talking about the 
conversation with the unidentified person at the county and 
the telephone conversation, the subsequent telephone 
conversation with the unidentified person at Hartford— 
MR. PARKINSON: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE JUDGE: — both of which Mr. Ellison is the 
only, only person who can tell us about it. And so isn't 
that an 804 because the a, the witness, the declarant is 
unavailable. 
MR. PARKINSON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
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MR. PARKINSON: And it's statements against their 
interest and it's a,— 
THE JUDGE: It's not former testimony, statements. 
MR. PARKINSON: And their admissions of a, of a 
party. 
THE JUDGE: Well, the statement which at the time 
of its making was so far contrary to the defendant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest or so far tended to subject 
the declarant to civil liability, or to render invalid a 
claim that a reasonable person would have not have made the 
statement unless believing it to be true. 
MR. PARKINSON: Well isn't that, I mean, it's so 
far that they've a, that they've certainly fought this case 
thus far and they a plan to continue fighting it, if the 
court denies their motions for summary judgment, it seems— 
THE JUDGE: What's, what's the statement that, 
that you can, that it's possible to continue insurance? 
They don't deny that. 
MR. PARKINSON: I don't think the statement is... 
I think if you look at it again the plain reading of what a, 
of what people say, you know, they say, you know, if you keep 
her on there that's fine. I think that the plain 
understanding is as long as you keep paying her, paying for 
her you're able to a, keep her on the contract, you're able 
to keep her on the insurance, and you're able to recover it. 
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I mean, they were not, there is no, it's not a formalized 
contract, you know, with a wherefor, couple of wherefor 
clauses at the beginning and that sort of thing. But I think 
they are the types of statements that are, that a layperson 
would reasonably rely on. 
I should state that the county did, did know prior 
to the passing of this period that a, that Mr. Ellison had, 
had filed for divorce. I think also just kind of on a, clean 
up issues a,— 
THE JUDGE: Well I can, I can take judicial notice 
that all kinds of people file for divorce and don't get a 
divorce. So knowing that they filed for divorce doesn't 
really get us anywhere, does it? 
MR. PARKINSON: Yes. But there was a, there was 
an email about the continuation of health insurance policy 
after the divorce so I think it was more than just knowing 
that— 
THE JUDGE: He clearly knew— 
MR. PARKINSON: — they filed for divorce. 
THE JUDGE: — there was a problem or he wouldn't 
have made the calls. 
MR. PARKINSON: Yes. He made, he made the calls 
to try to figure out what to do. And I think that was 
reasonable for him to do during the a, during the process. 
I think Ms. Daly's (phonetic) statement of that, 
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that's fine is a reasonable ratification statement for a 
layperson. The other statements a, I've mentioned. 
And I think, you know, the idea that they can make 
these deceptively half true statements and then hide behind 
the other aspect of the truth I don't; I don't think that's 
fair in this context. 
THE JUDGE: You think what Ms. Daly (phonetic) 
said was deceptive, how— 
MR. PARKINSON: Well if... I don't think it was, 
no. I don't think it was deceptively half true. I think 
they are trying to turn it to be deceptively half true. 
Yes, you can continue it. And then the unspoken part of the 
statement is that a, if you go ahead and fill out all these 
papers and, and complete this process. And they are trying 
to say that that i s — 
THE JUDGE: Didn't she send him on to somebody to 
get that done and say if it doesn't work out call me back? 
MR. PARKINSON: She sent him on not to get that 
done, she just sent him on to get another confirmation. I 
mean, that's not what she's saying I'm sending you on to a — 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. PARKINSON: — get some paperwork to fill 
out. 
Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
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FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MS. VAN ORMAN 
MS. VAN ORMAN: I'll be very brief, Your Honor. 
There's two issues that I think would be helpful for a 
clarification to the court. 
Regarding the alleged conversation with a, the 
county one thing counsel has mentioned he keeps referring to 
as a telephone conversation. I don't think that was the 
testimony. He said that he went to the offices and spoke to 
somebody. We don't know where that was, we don't know if it 
was in the hall. It was not a direct phone call— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. VAN ORMAN: — to the personnel department. 
But I thought it would be helpful for the court t o — 
THE JUDGE: Yes. I thought, I thought the second 
of the two conversations to the anonymous person was 
telephone. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Correct. And that was to 
Hartford. 
THE JUDGE: Hartford. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Right. What might be helpful for 
the court is a little bit of a time frame on this. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. VAN ORMAN: The first conversation with 
Ms. Daly (phonetic) a, according to an affidavit from Nancy 
Burlindy (phonetic) at Hartford, and I believe that was 
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submitted as an exhibit, that conversation occurred 
January 30th, 2002. The divorce occurred October of 2003, 
or excuse me, August of 2003. And Ms. Ellison passed away 
October of 2003. So we're not talking about a situation 
where Mr. Ellison came to the county. And apparently if he 
had some kind of a conversation at the county with whomever 
he had that conversation with, this was not anywhere near in 
time to when the divorce occurred. 
This, there, there is no evidence, there's no 
allegation, there's nothing that Mr. Ellison ever came to the 
county and said I've had a divorce, or I've filed for 
divorce, it's pending, I have a life insurance policy, what 
do I do, let's sit down, who do I talk to, who is the person 
that I can talk to see what we can do. There's no 
allegations that anything like that ever occurred. 
What he alleges, and this is just so farfetched, 
but somehow some time prior to January 30th of 2002, so we're 
talking about over a year and a half prior, he somehow goes 
to the county, talks to somebody, we don't know what date, we 
don't know who he spoke with, and he says whatever he says 
that somehow they told him yes, all you have to do is 
continue paying your premiums. But the notice that he 
needed to provide to the county was look, here's my divorce 
decree, or I've filed for divorce or something. But there's 
no allegations that anything like that ever happened. This 
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ic ysst sc~e kir.f cf a conversation soir.e^ iers. 
And I think it, Your Honor, you were very 
perceptive when you talked about a, what exception to the 
hearsay rule are we talking about here. 804 with the 
declarant unavailable. Who is the declarant? That's the 
thing. We need an identity, we need something other than 
some conversation with somebody who happened to be in the 
Utah County personnel building a year and a half prior. I 
mean, that is so far off I just don't see where there's any 
evidence to, to substantiate any kind of a conversation to 
prove that to therefore trigger the duty on the part of the 
county. 
I thought the other information, Your Honor, that 
would be a, informative for Your Honor is a, the fact 
regarding the insurance policy being made available to 
Mr. Ellison. In Mr. Ellison's deposition, and I believe this 
was provided, on page 13 of his deposition he was asked, 
Is it possible that at one of the 
benefit fairs you attended at the county 
that there were written materials 
available on the Hartford life insurance 
policy? 
His answer: There may have been. 
He says: Yes, I suppose it's 
possible. 
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Question: Is it also possible that at 
one of those benefits fair you were 
provided a copy of the Hartford life 
insurance policy? 
He says: No. 
How do you know that? 
Well, if I would have received a copy I 
would have had it in my files. 
So you keep all the copies of all of 
the health insurance information and the 
other information provided to you at the 
benefits fair? 
Yes. 
And you currently have that for as long 
as you've been employed? 
He said: They give you new materials 
each year. 
So you throw away the old ones? 
He said: Except for life insurance. 
He said: I do keep several years of 
health insurance. 
And he was asked: Do you believe you 
would have asked anyone at Utah County in 
the personal department for a copy of the 
Hartford life insurance policy that they 
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would have given you a copy? 
And he said: Yes. 
He says: You don't know if they would 
or wouldn't? 
He says: I don't know, ya. 
We asked: Do you have any evidence 
that we could objectively look at that 
would say to a reasonable person that the 
county would not have given you a copy of 
the policy? 
He says: No. 
They that, they had the insurance fairs, the health 
fairs, the policy materials were made available there. I 
think that the county people have testified to that. If he 
would have ever asked he would have been provided a copy. 
Also those fairs are mandatory that the employees have to 
attend, they can't get out of attending those fairs. So I 
think that any kind of argument that he wasn't given a copy 
of the policy, there's never been any kind of an allegation 
that he ask for one and wasn't given it. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Thank you. 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. CHRISTIANSEN 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: One last tiny point, because I 
think we've covered the ground. 
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I just v.T-ited to remind you of two cases, 
Your Honor. The Pack versus Case case and the Rodowitz 
(phonetic) versus Massachusetts case. And both of those 
cases say that for estoppel or modification the alleged 
representation must be a specific and definite statement. 
And the reason I think that's important is because 
of the line of questioning Your Honor was doing which was 
show me the representation where he can continue as a 
beneficiary. There's no representation in the record that 
he would continue as a beneficiary of the converted policy. 
And I think taking the Pack versus Case case and the Rodowitz 
(phonetic) versus Massachusetts case which requires a 
specific and definite statement it's not here, it's a missing 
piece of evidence. 
Thanks, Your Honor. 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: I, I think I know how I want to rule 
and a, candidly I'm inclined to rule now. I'm out of the 
office next week. If I wait two weeks to write this I'm 
going to have to refigure this all out again. So here 
goes. 
First of all, I do not find that there's credible 
evidence to support either the first conversation with an 
unidentified county employee or a second conversation with 
someone at the Hartford company. The only evidence to 
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here. I don't think it would have been reasonable for 
Mr. Ellison to ignore the plain language of the contract in 
favor of whatever he thought he had heard from Ms. Daly 
(phonetic). 
There's no, there's no evidence of fraud because 
there was no evidence of a misrepresentation to an existing 
fact, there's no evidence that there was reasonable reliance 
and there's no evidence of damages. 
And similarly with regard to estoppel there's no 
evidence of reasonable reliance, there's no evidence of a 
misrepresentation by an appropriate agent, and most 
critically there's no evidence of damages. 
So I'm going to grant the summary judgment for both 
the county and for the insurance company on those bases. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Would you like that, us to 
prepare that? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. I think it would be very helpful 
if you would. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you very much. Very well 
briefed, very well argued. Thanks to all of you. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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APPENDIX B 
SIGNED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS DATED 
JANUARY 22,2008 
ERIK A. CHRISTIANSEN (7372) 
JEFFREY J. DROUBAY (9119) 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Hartford Life And Accident 
Insurance Company 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VAL M. ELLISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT and 
HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Connecticut 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF DEFENDANTS 
Case No. 050402012 
Judge: Hon. James R. Taylor 
Division #7 
INTRODUCTION 
1. On July 20, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant Hartford Life and 
Accident Insurance Company's ("Hartford") Motion for Summary Judgment and on Defendant 
Utah County Government's ("Utah County") Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Val M. 
Ellison was represented by Kenneth Parkinson of Howard Lewis & Petersen. Defendant 
Hartford was represented by Erik A. Christiansen of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Defendant Utah 
6 
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County was represented by Kristin A. VanOrman of Strong and Haoni. After careful review of 
the briefs, all admissible evidence and oral argument the Court hereby rules and orders as 
follows: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
2. Mr. Ellison's claims center around his contention that he is entitled to life 
insurance proceeds under an employee life insurance plan offered by Utah County ("the Plan"), 
his employer. The undisputed facts are that the Plan was offered by Utah County to its eligible 
employees and was funded by a group life insurance policy issued by Hartford to Utah County. 
The Plan permitted eligible Utah County employees to elect dependent life insurance coverage 
for their dependents. The Policy defines "Dependent" as "Your spouse" and "Your unmarried 
child." The Policy also states that dependent coverage terminates on the date when, "the 
Dependent no longer meets the definition of Dependent." A dependent whose coverage ends 
because he/she ceases to meet the definition of "Dependent" has the option under the Policy to 
convert his/her dependent coverage into a conversion policy. The Policy explains, 
How does an individual convert coverage? 
To convert life insurance, the individual must, within 31 days of 
the date group coverage terminates, make written application to Us 
and pay the premium for his age and class of risk. 
3. It is undisputed that in about 1998, Mr. Ellison elected dependent life insurance 
coverage for Sherrie Ellison, his wife at that time. In 2001, Sherrie Ellison was diagnosed with 
pancreatic cancer, a condition that was terminal. During the period of her illness, Sherrie Ellison 
initiated divorce proceedings against Mr. Ellison. On August 21, 2003, the divorce was 
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finalized. Sherrie Ellison died on October 19, 2003. She never converted her group dependent 
life insurance coverage into an individual policy. 
4. It also is undisputed that after Sherrie Ellison's death, Mr. Ellison made a claim 
for life insurance proceeds to Hartford. Hartford denied the claim on the grounds that Sherrie 
Ellison ceased to be eligible for dependent life insurance coverage after her divorce from Mr. 
Ellison, because she no longer met the definition of "Dependent." 
5. Mr. Ellison claims, however, that prior to his and Sherrie Ellison's divorce, he 
had a conversation with someone at Utah County and that he believed that he spoke with two 
Hartford representatives wherein he was told that life insurance coverage for Sherrie Ellison 
could continue subsequent to their divorce. Mr. Ellison specifically identified in his 
interrogatory responses a call on January 30, 2003, and testified during his deposition that he was 
transferred to a second Hartford representative during that call. Mr. Ellison does not know the 
identity of the alleged other employee with whom he claims he spoke. Hartford has produced in 
discovery a recording of a single telephone conversation Mr. Ellison had with one of its 
representatives, Linda Daly. 
6. Both plaintiffs and defendant's phone records revealed only one telephone call 
from plaintiff to Hartford. During that recorded phone call, Ellison spoke with Ms. Daly of 
Hartford's Medical Underwriting area. In that phone call with Ms. Daly, Ellison stated that Utah 
County informed him that he could continue insurance on his spouse, even if he and his wife 
divorced. He asked Ms. Daly if this was accurate. Ms. Daly responded, 
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I believe so yes. . . . I don ' t . . . I haven't heard anything as to why, 
I think that's your option if you want to . . . They're going to be 
payroll deducting for her so if you want to keep her on there, that's 
fine. 
7. Ellison next told Ms. Daly that he needed a letter for the court. Ms. Daly asked if 
he had filled out a personal health statement, and he said that he had. Ms. Daly then responded: 
I'm trying to think who would be . . . we're in the medical 
underwriting area and what we do is we simply underwrite the 
application, we really, we don't administer the plan, . . . Did your 
benefits or HR department tell you to call us? 
8. Ellison responded his HR department had told him to call Hartford and said again 
that he needed something in writing. At that point, Ms. Daly responded: 
You know what, I'm going to transfer you to another number that 
may be able to help you and hopefully they can, if they cannot, 
you know, feel free to call me back and we'll reseairch it further to 
see who can help you. 
At this point, Mr. Ellison asked for Ms. Daly's name to write down. She spelled her name for 
him and gave him another number to call. 
9. According to the transcript, the call then terminated. There is no evidence on the 
transcript that Mr. Ellison was transferred to another person or number. The transcript also 
reveals that Mr. Ellison did not ask Ms. Daly what he needed to do, e.g. complete paperwork or 
otherwise, in order to effect the continuation of coverage on his ex-wife. 
10. Neither Hartford, Utah County, nor Ellison has any documentary record or 
recording of any second phone call to Hartford. 
11. At no time, as admitted by Mr. Ellison, did Mr. Ellison ask for or obtain a copy of 
the Policy. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
12. Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah. R. Civ. Pro. 56(b). All inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the facts should be 
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Ho v. Jim's Enter., Inc., 29 P.3d 633, 634 (Utah 
2001); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The party opposing summary 
judgment has the duty to "set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." DLB 
Collection Trust by Helgesen & Waterfall v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e)). "[B]are contentions unsupported by any specification of facts in support 
thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will preclude entry of summary judgment." Massey 
v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980). Moreover, a party opposing summary 
judgment must do so with admissible evidence. Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 101 
P.3d 371, 377 (Utah App. 2004). 
13. As set forth in the pleadings and the undisputed admissible evidence before the 
Court, the Court holds that Mr. Ellison's claim for breach of contract against Hartford and Utah 
County fails as a matter of law because Sherrie Ellison was not covered by the Policy's 
unambiguous dependent coverage provisions once she divorced Mr. Ellison and no longer met 
the Policy's definition of "Dependent." See Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 
1125, 1129 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 
773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) and Draughon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Soc'y, 111 P.2d 1105, 
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1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)) (stating that when interpreting an insurance policy, Utah courts look 
to the "four corners of the agreement" to determine the intent of the parties, and if that intent is 
clear and unambiguous, the court will give effect to it). 
14. As set forth in the pleadings and undisputed admissible evidence before the Court, 
the Court also holds that Ellison's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim 
against Hartford fails as a matter of law because, in the insurance context, such a claim cannot be 
maintained if the insurer denied a claim that was "fairly debatable." Prince v. Bear River Mut. 
Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 533 (Utah 2002) (citing Morris v. Health Net of Calif, Inc., 988 P.2d 940 
(Utah 1999); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996); Callioux v. 
Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). The Policy states that dependent 
life insurance coverage ends on the date a dependent ceases to meet the Policy's definition of 
"Dependent." Sherrie Ellison ceased to meet the Policy's definition of "Dependent" when her 
divorce from Mr. Ellison became final. For this reason, the Court concludes that Hartford's 
denial of Mr. Ellison's claim on these grounds is "fairly debatable." 
15. Based on the pleadings before the Court and the undisputed admissible facts 
before the Court, the Court concludes that Mr. Ellison's fraud claim against Utah County and 
Hartford fails as a matter of law for multiple and independent reasons as set forth herein: 
16. A party asserting a fraud claim bears the burden of proving each of the elements 
of that claim by clear and convincing evidence. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 
536 (Utah 2002) (quoting Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198 
(2001)). 
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17. Mr. Ellison's fraud claim fails because there is no admissible evidence that he 
reasonably relied upon the statements of Ms. Daly. The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that 
any reasonable person, after speaking to Ms. Daly, would have investigated further, obtained 
further paperwork, including a copy of the policy, and/or come back to Ms. Daly for more 
information. A reasonable person would not have done nothing, as Mr. Ellison admitted he did 
in this case. 
18. Based on the undisputed facts and admissible evidence before the Court, the 
Court further concludes that there is no admissible evidence to support Mr. Ellison's assertion of 
a conversation with an unknown and unidentifiable Utah County employee regarding the 
continuation of life insurance benefits for Sherrie Ellison. Similarly, there is no admissible 
evidence to support Mr. Ellison's assertion of a separate conversation with an unknown and 
unidentifiable employee at Hartford. 
19. The Court finds that, in the absence of any admissible evidence, Mr. Ellison's 
representations regarding his alleged communications with Hartford and Utah County are 
unreliable, inadmissible, and cannot be taken as a sufficient evidentiary and factual basis to 
establish the fact of or the content of those alleged conversations with unknown and 
unidentifiable persons. 
20. Further, the only conversation that is documented, Mr. Ellison's January 30, 2002 
conversation with Linda Daly of Hartford, is insufficient to establish reasonable reliance and 
extend the express terms of the life insurance policy. 
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21. The Court also concludes separately and independently that there was no 
reasonable reliance by Mr. Ellison as a matter of law because Perkins v. Great-West Life 
Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) controls the analysis of this issue. In 
Perkins, the Utah Court of Appeals held that an insured's reliance upon the post-contract 
representations of the insurers agent is not reasonable when those representations contradict the 
plain terms of the insurance policy and the insured has access to that policy. Id. at 1130; see also 
Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Management, LLC, 223 F. Supp.2d 474, 485 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that reliance is unreasonable "as a matter of law" "where the statements 
relied upon are explicitly contradicted by a written agreement between the parties involved."); 
Govt. Computer Sales, Inc. v. Dell Marketing, L.R, No. F04-0030 CV (RRB), 2005 WL 
1713182 *3 (Alaska 2005) ("Plaintiff could not reasonably have relied on representations so 
clearly inconsistent with its written contract and agreements."); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v 
Spraggins, 853 So.2d 913, 916 (Ala. 2002) ("[A] party cannot reasonably rely on such a 
statement when the written . . . agreement signed by them clearly contradicts any such alleged 
statement." (citations omitted)). Because Mr. Ellison, with reasonable diligence, could have 
obtained a copy of his policy and discovered the requirements of the conversion provisions, his 
reliance on post-contract representations, if any, was unreasonable as a matter of law. 
22. The Court also finds that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the 
transcript of the recording of the Daly call manifests an intent by Ms. Daly to deceive or 
misrepresent a fact. Thus, Mr. Ellison's fraud claim fails for this separate and independent 
reason as well. 
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23. The Court also finds that there was no misrepresentation regarding in existing 
material fact in this case, and that Mr. Ellison's fraud claim also fails for this separate and 
independent reason. "fArf—mi^ yepresentatiro r^—of intended future pcrformaftee—4s~-ne£—a-
repfeseft£ati©i^oncer^ 
£p:fe^-4h^pF^^ 
k&upr-feer-wr -W&¥h&e&?S!€m>prr^^ Ct. App. 1994)-
(citing CcvrUos Truckm^Qo-, v Utah Venture No J, ,64&^2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982^—:Eh^ 
mnot^upport44rr4^ 
24. The Court finds that Mr. Ellison's fraud claim fails separately and independently 
as a matter of law because there is no admissible evidence of damages. Specifically, there is no 
connection between Mr. Ellison's alleged loss and his claimed damages in this case. There is no 
admissible evidence from which the fact-finder can reasonably infer that Sheme Ellison would 
have converted her group insurance policy into an individual policy, and there is no evidence that 
Mr. Ellison, rather than Sherrie Ellison's estate or heirs, would have been the beneficiaries of 
that conversion policy. 
25. Mr. Ellison's estoppel claim against Hartford fails for many of the same reasons 
that his fraud claim fails as set forth herein: 
26. First, to establish a claim of estoppel, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable 
reliance. As discussed above, Mr. Ellison's reliance was not reasonable as a matter of 
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undisputed fact or law. See Perkins, 814 P.2d 1125; Internet Law Library, 223 F. Supp. 2d 474; 
Govt Computer Sales, No. F04-0030 CV (RRB), 2005 WL 1713182; Jim Walter Homes, 853 
So. 2d 913. 
27. Second, for the reasons set forth above, there is no admissible evidence of any 
misrepresentation by an employee of Hartford. Similarly, there is no admissible evidence of any 
misrepresentation by an employee of Hartford who had legal authority to bind Hartford. The 
representations of an employee are not binding upon a company unless those representations 
concern a matter made within the scope of the employee's agency. See Wayment v. Clear 
Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 116 P.3d 271, 287 (Utah 2005). Based on the undisputed 
admissible facts before the Court, that is not the case here. 
28. Finally, and most of all, for the reasons set forth above, there is no admissible 
evidence of damages to give rise to a claim of estoppel. 
29. Mr. Ellison's negligence claim against Utah County fails as a matter of law 
because, as discussed above, there is no admissible evidence of any conversation between Mr. 
Ellison and Utah County wherein the County negligently represented to Mr. Ellison that life 
insurance coverage for Sherrie Ellison would continue after their divorce. 
30. Mr. Ellison's negligence claim also fails because it is premised primarily upon 
Utah County's alleged failure to inform him of the Policy provisions and procedures, particularly 
the Policy's conversion procedures. However, Mr. Ellison could have, with reasonable 
diligence, obtained a copy of the Policy and informed himself regarding the Policy's provisions 
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and procedures Mr Ellison, however, admits that he took no steps to obtain a copy of the Policy 
during the releyant time period. 
GRANTING OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
31. For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Mr. Ellison has 
failed to present any genuine factual disputes sufficient to forestall summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court therefore finds 
that all of Plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of law, and are hereby dismisggd, with prejudice. 
32. The Court hereby grants summary judgment in f^^^£^mtf^i^^d Utah County 
on all of Plaintiff s claims, all of which are hereby dismissed, 
DATED this <9<£ day of S / ^ ~ 2 0 0 ^ 
Approved as to form: 
Kenneth Parkinson 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Kristin A. Van Orman 
Counsel for Utah County Government 
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APPENDIX C 
TELEPHONE TRANSCRIPT OF ELLISON PHONE 
CALL WITH HARTFORD INSURANCE 
TRANSCRIPTION OF ELLISON PHONE CALL 
Daly: Medical Underwriting, this is Linda, how can I help you? 
Ellison: Hi Linda, Val Ellison calling, from uh Utah. 
Daly: Okay. 
Ellison: Where are you guys at? 
Daley: Connecticut. 
Ellison: Connecticut? Okay, I guess so, Hartford, right? 
Daly. Yeah, 
Ellison: Um, I guess, uh, I work for Utah County Government. 
Daly: Okay. 
Ellison: And so you guys apparently have taken over for our life insurance, for this year. 
And My wife and I are getting a divorce, but personnel told me that you can 
continue insurance on your spouse even if you get divorced, is this accurate? 
Daly: I believe so yes. I don't... I haven't heard anything as to why. I think that's your 
option if you want to and you continue to ... they're going to be payroll deducting 
for her so if you want to keep her on there, that's fine. 
Ellison: Now, uh, what I will need then is just a letter stating so for the court, saying that it 
is possible and then I will tell them that I will continue it. 
Daly: What did ... Have you filled out a personal health statement yet, or no? 
Ellison: Well, yeah, from way back, ya know. I've been with the County for a long time so 
it's just been coming out of my payroll forever but it changes life insurance 
company from year to year ... or maybe every couple years ... so yeah, we did, a 
long time ago. 
Daly: I'm trying to think who would be ... we're in the medical underwriting area and 
what we do is we simply underwrite the application - we really, we don't 
administer the plan. 
Ellison: Okay. 
Daly: So, did your benefits or you HR department tell you to call us? 
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Ellison: They did. They gave me your phone number, they said, yes it is true that it can 
continue, but I said I needed something in writing, and they said, well, call the 
insurance company. 
Daly: You know what, I'm going to transfer you to another number that may be able to 
help you, um, and hopefully they can. If they cannot, you know, feel free to call 
me back and we'll research it further to see who can help you ... 
Ellison: Okay, let me write down your name again... 
Daly: Okay. 
Ellison: What was it... 
Daly: Linda and my last name is Daly, D-A-L-Y. The number I'm going to give you, 
I'm not sure if anybody's going to be there because it's 6:00 here and you came in 
right before the phones get shut off. 
Ellison: Gotcha, okay. 
Daley So the number is 1-800-523-2233 and they're more on the administrative side of 
it, the billing side, so they may be able to help you. If they can't, you can call me 
back and my number is 1-800-331-7234 and I'll give you my extension, which is 
39642, and I'll try to research it here and see what I can find out if they're unable 
to help you. And again, the same thing stands for here, though our phone gets 
shut off at 6:00, so I don't know if you'll be able to get back in. 
Ellison: Good. 
Daly: Okay. 
Ellison Thank you Linda. 
Daly: You're welcome. 
Ellison: Bye. 
Daly: Bye, bye. 
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